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Dissertation Abstract 
This research focused on evaluating the perceptions of food defense risk 
management by state officials, evaluating the validity of a criticality assessment 
created by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), and 
developing a new geographic information system (GIS) based criticality 
assessment method.  Specific objectives included:  (1) investigating and 
reporting the history of food and agriculture criticality assessments; (2) 
conducting a survey to identify state officials’ risk perceptions related to food and 
agriculture criticality; (3) analyzing the data collected by the most widely used 
criticality assessment method (i.e., Food and Agriculture Systems Criticality 
Assessment Tool); and, (4) developing a new method to objectively measure 
food system criticality.   
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Chapter One:  History of Food Defense 
  
  2 
 The challenge of security is not identifying all of the potential targets, 
threats, and bad actors, but the challenge of security lies in identifying the most 
critical assets to the nation, and creating resiliency around them. 
Historical Context of Food Defense 
 The attacks on September 11, 2001 by the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda 
forever changed the United States (U.S.) and the world.  These terrorist actions 
were momentous as they changed the U.S.’ perceptions of the world and created 
a new paradigm coined as the new normal (Abrams, Albright, & Panofsky, 2004)  
The new normal is the period of time that follows uncontrollable, catastrophic, 
and traumatic events.  During the acclimation to the new normal, the U.S. 
populace and government’s schema of threats and hazards dramatically 
changed.  Consequently, the U.S. examined all potential and known hazards to 
critical infrastructures, which ignited a new interest in bioterrorism (e.g., the use 
of bacteria, viruses, prions, and toxins as weapons), chemical terrorism (e.g., the 
use of acute chemicals that cause tearing, vomiting, psychological disruption, 
blistering, choking, or nervous system disruption), and the intentional use of 
these agents to contaminate food and water systems. 
 Biological agents have been used as a military tactic for millennia (Jacobs, 
2004).  The use of biological agents has centered on four main strategies: (1) 
disseminating inoculated blankets or clothing, (2) launching infected materials 
into enemy positions, (3) inoculating traditional weapons with potentially infective 
materials, and (4) contaminating food or water supplies.  Of the aforementioned 
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strategies, utilizing the enemy’s food and water as a vehicle for biowarfare has 
been a successful military tactic throughout history.  
 Similarly, chemical agents have been used as weapons since the classical 
era (Costigliola & Quagliata, 2010).  The use of chemical weapons has centered 
on four main strategies: (1) launching highly flammable chemicals into enemy 
positions, (2) contaminating large areas with gases to prevent the enemy from 
operating efficiently or to prevent occupation of an area, (3) including chemical 
irritants with conventional weapons to enhance the weapon’s effectiveness, and 
(4) contaminating food or water supplies.  Akin to bioterrorism, chemical warfare 
has been and continues to be an effective weapon against civilian populations, 
water systems, and food systems. 
Food Defense: Pre World War I 
 Throughout human history, there are multiple examples of introducing 
chemical and biological agents into the water and food systems as a means to 
attack, weaken, and disrupt enemies.  The Assyrians reportedly poisoned the 
wells of their enemies with rye ergot in 600 B.C. (Frischknecht, 2003).  Ergot is a 
fungus that produces an alkaloid (mycotoxin) that causes muscle cramps, 
vomiting, gangrene, and hallucinations and is toxic to humans (Fung & Clark, 
2004).  In 590 B.C., the Athenian politician Solon dumped the herb purgative 
hellebore into the city of Cirrha’s water aqueduct causing intractable diarrhea and 
Cirrha’s soldiers subsequently deserted their posts (Lane & Borzelleca, 2008).  In 
roughly 200 B.C., Carthaginians contaminated wine with mandrake, which 
contains tropane alkaloids and cause hallucinations and retrograde amnesia, to 
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sedate their enemies (Smart, 1997).  Barbarossa contaminated the enemy’s 
water supply with the bodies of dead soldiers in 1155 A.D. (Poupard & Miller, 
1992).  The Spanish military in 1495 A.D. used a similar tactic as the 
Carthaginians and gave wine tainted with leprosy-infected blood to French 
soldiers (Smart, 1997).  During the American Civil War Confederate forces 
deliberately contaminated the Union’s water supplies by dragging killed farm 
animals to their drinking ponds (Lesho, Dorsey, & Bunner, 1998).  History has 
demonstrated that chemical and biological agents are relatively easy to use as a 
weapon and can cause high numbers of casualties. Therefore, society should 
take reasonable preventative measures to prevent attacks on food and water 
supplies. 
Food Defense: World War I  
 As science progressed over time, so did the available methods for 
biowarfare.  During World War I, a series of biowarfare events occurred.  While 
some of the following events are more representative of agroterrorism (malicious 
attacks against plants and animals used in the production of food), some of these 
attacks were targeted at the animals’ feed and are worthy of discussion.  First, 
Major Franz von Papen, a German military spy in Washington D.C., 
unsuccessfully attempted to contaminate the feed for horses and cattle that were 
to be exported to aid Allied Forces in England (Jacobs, 2004).  Later, Anton 
Dilger, a German surgeon educated in the U.S., was discharged from the 
German military after a nervous breakdown in 1915 and he subsequently 
transported cultures of Bacillus anthracis and Burkholderia mallei to sabotage the 
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production of warhorses in the U.S. (Wheelis, 1998).  Bacteria cultured in Dilger’s 
laboratory in Maryland were given to Captain Frederick Hinsch, who used the 
agents to inoculate horses in Baltimore before they were shipped to Allied forces 
in Europe (Woolsey, 1941).  In 1916, German covert agents attempted to infect 
sheep bound for Russia with Bacillus anthracis and Burkholderia mallei.  The 
covert agents were caught, and their cultures were confiscated from them.  In 
1917, a German saboteur was arrested for allegedly infecting 4500 mules with 
glanders (Poupard & Miller, 1992).   
Food Defense: World War II – Cold War Era 
 From World War I to World War II there were significant advancements 
technology (microbiology and chemistry) that enabled people to launch more 
severe biological and chemical attacks (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1999).  During 
World War II (WWII), the Japanese contaminated Chinese wells and river water 
with Salmonella typhimurium, and gave Chinese children chocolates laced with 
Bacillus anthracis (Burrows & Renner, 1999; Harris, 1992).  During WWII and the 
Cold War, the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, Soviet Union/Russia, 
and Iraq developed biological weapons programs and conducted biological 
weapons research.   
 Although many nations developed biological weapons during the Cold 
War, none of the Cold War era weapons that were developed were ever used on 
a large scale (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin, & Eitzen Jr.,1997).  However, there 
were many acts of intentional food contamination committed by individuals.  In 
Japan in 1964, Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki, a bacteriologist, contaminated sponge cakes 
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and other foods with Shigella dysenteriae and Salmonella typhimurium to exact 
revenge against his coworkers (Anderson, Friedman, & Bendinelli, 2006).  In 
1972, Chicago police arrested two teenagers who were days away from 
contaminating Chicago’s municipal water supply with Salmonella typhimurium 
(Carus, 2001).  The two teens created a white supremacist organization  named 
RISE, and planned to start a new master race by vaccinating the group’s 
members against selected agents so that they would not be affected by the 
group’s contamination of the Chicago area water system.  The leaders of RISE 
had only recruited and vaccinated a handful of members when two of the new 
recruits informed the police of the pending attack.  Subsequent criminal 
investigations revealed that the founders had stocks of Salmonella typhimurium.  
In 1977, a Norwegian nurse Arfinn Nesset poisoned and killed at least 22 
patients with the muscle relaxer Curacit (Ansumana, 2010).  
 In September and October of 1984, an epidemic of Salmonella 
typhimurium caused 751 cases of gastroenteritis in The Dalles, Oregon (Carus, 
1997).  Although an extensive epidemiologic outbreak investigation conducted by 
the Oregon Public Health Division and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) associated the source of the outbreak to salad bars in local 
restaurants, government officials discovered a year later that the epidemic was 
the result of deliberate food contamination by the Rajneeshees cult.  Officials 
learned that the cult planned to sicken the community in an attempt to reduce 
voter turnout during an upcoming election in Wasco County.  The group decided 
to conduct a trial run of the attack, and during the trial run the Rajneeshees 
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repeatedly and deliberately contaminated numerous local salad bars, 
restaurants, and grocery store produce with Salmonella typhimurium resulting in 
the 1984 epidemic.  Two members of the Rajneeshees cult were eventually 
convicted for their role in the first successful act of bioterrorism on U.S. soil 
(Török, Tauxe, Wise, Livengood, Sokolow, Mauvais, ... & Foster, 1997).   
In 1989, the South African Civilian Cooperation Bureau allegedly launched a 
failed cholera attack on Namibia’s water supply (Burgess & Purkitt, 2001).  In 
1990, Giardia lamblia was used to contaminate water tanks in Scotland (Mobley, 
1995).  These examples of intentional food contamination and bioterrorism 
demonstrate the threat and vulnerabilities to the global food system. 
Food Defense & Bioterrorism: 1991 to Present 
 Despite the fact that most Cold War era weapons were destroyed or have 
remained under adequate protection and control since the end of the Cold War, 
70% of the biological crimes (biocrimes) and biological terrorism (bioterrorism) of 
the 20th century occurred after 1990 (Jacobs, 2004).  The rise in bioterrorism 
since 1990 can be attributed to increasing technological sophistication, increased 
resources, and fluctuating motives of the perpetrators of bioterrorism.   
 More sophisticated bioterrorism threats and attacks emerged during the 
1990s.  In 1992, a right wing anti-government terrorist group in Minnesota, 
named the Patriots Council, manufactured ricin and the solvent dimethyl 
sulfoxide.  The Patriots Council planned to murder federal and local law 
enforcement agents by mixing the ricin with the dimethyl sulfoxide to enable the 
ricin to be more quickly absorbed through dermal tissue.  These terrorists 
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extracted the ricin from castor beans using instructions and beans they obtained 
via open sources.  Members of the Patriots Council were later convicted and 
sentenced to prison for their role in the plot, becoming the first convictions under 
the Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act of 1989 (Tucker, 1996).  Although 
the bioterrorism plan was disrupted by law enforcement, this bioterrorism 
operation demonstrates the dedication and technical ability of would be terrorists. 
 The Japanese apocalyptic terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo drew 
international attention in the spring of 1995 after the terrorist group performed a 
well-coordinated attack using the nerve gas sarin on the Tokyo subway system, 
killing 12 and injuring 5000 people (Laqueur, 1996).  This incident demonstrated 
that terrorist organizations had the resources and capability to covertly launch 
highly effective attacks on civilians.  Additionally, this group was found to be in 
possession of a hydrogen cyanide aerosol distribution device, cultures of Ebola 
and anthrax, botulinum toxin, and many other miscellaneous chemicals and 
weapons that could be used to launch a wide variety of chemical, biological, and 
kinetic attacks. 
 Larry Wayne Harris was arrested in 1995 for illegally obtaining stocks of 
Yersinia pestis, which was the cause of the plague (Stern, 1999).  Harris ordered 
the pathogen from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) in Rockville, 
Maryland.  Only when he complained about a delay in the shipment were 
employees at the ATCC suspicious enough to report him.  Harris claimed that the 
cultures were part of his plan to find a cure for plague and protect citizens from 
the Iraqi biologic weapons threat.  Harris was convicted of fraud in acquiring the 
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cultures, and sentenced to 18 months probation.  Harris may have also been 
responsible for a disruptive explosion of anthrax hoax letters mailed in 1998 and 
1999.  Harris was arrested again in early 1998 for possession of anthrax.  
Although the anthrax strain proved to be a harmless veterinary vaccine strain, it 
is unclear if Harris had any terrorist intent in either of the events.  The 
bioterrorism acts discussed in this section do not include all bioterrorism attacks 
executed; the bioterrorism acts discussed indicate that the bioterrorism threat is 
real and has increased since 1990. 
 One of the most underreported food defense events occurred in 1996.  In 
1996, a terrorist revealed that chlordane (an organochlorine pesticide) had been 
used to contaminate liquid animal fats produced at a Wisconsin factory (Foxell 
Jr., 2001).  Many of these animal fats had already been shipped to more than 
4,000 dairy farm customers in Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota.  Subsequently, 
the contaminated milk was shipped to cheese, butter, and ice cream 
manufacturing plants in northern Illinois and Wisconsin.  Fortunately, the prompt 
interdiction of subsequent shipments prevented contaminated products from 
reaching consumers.  However, this incident caused $4 million in damages to 
companies.  Later that year, a disgruntled laboratory employee, Diane 
Thompson, at the St. Paul Medical Center hospital in Dallas, Texas contaminated 
blueberry muffins and doughnuts with a laboratory strain of Shigella dysenteriae 
type 2 (Dembek, 2010).  The contained muffins were disseminated to her 
colleagues causing everyone that consumed the pastries to become ill (12 
people).  These incidents demonstrated the devastating losses food companies 
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can incur from intentional food contamination events and that insider attacks can 
be highly effective and difficult to prevent. 
 The capabilities of these terrorist groups and deranged individuals 
demonstrate that terrorist organizations and individuals may be able to launch 
deadly foodborne bioterrorist attacks.  If terrorist groups can gain access to 
government funded biologic weapons programs (as may have happened in the 
U.S. anthrax attacks of 2001), achieve the technical expertise necessary to 
successfully weaponize environmentally persistent biological agents, or 
manufacture toxic chemicals, then the current threat environment includes a 
multitude of hypothetical attacks with numerous modus operandi (Inglesby, 
O'Toole, Henderson, Bartlett, Ascher, Eitzen, ... & Tonat, 2002).  With an infinite 
amount of potential targets, agents, and terrorist motivations, the history of 
bioterrorism indicates that the enemy has the advantage, and this tremendous 
advantage will persist into the future.  Thus, policy makers and risk managers 
tend to want to identify all of the potential targets, threats, weapons, and bad 
actors.  This is why policy makers and risk managers tend to focus on the 
consequences of bioterrorist attacks and focusing on bioterrorism consequences 
enables these people to make difficult resource allocation decisions to mitigate 
bioterrorism risks. 
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Chapter Two: The Development and Use of the Food and 
Agriculture Systems Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) 
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After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the United States (U.S.) 
government established a policy to identify critical infrastructure, including food 
and agriculture production systems, to protect them from terrorist attacks.  
Criticality is defined as the negative impact that an attack on or failure of a given 
infrastructure would have on the nation if it were compromised or destroyed.  
Food and agriculture systems were identified as one of 18 critical infrastructures.  
Identifying which food systems were the most critical to the nation was an 
enormous task since the food and agriculture sector is almost entirely privately 
owned, is comprised of an estimated 2.1 million farms, has over 1 million 
production facilities, and accounts for roughly one-fifth of U.S. economic activity.  
To assist the Department of Homeland Security in determining which food 
systems were the most critical to the nation, the National Center for Food 
Protection and Defense developed the Food and Agriculture Systems Criticality 
Assessment Tool (FASCAT) to support states’ identification of critical systems.  
The FASCAT documented, evaluated, and compared 731 disparate complex 
food and agriculture systems across 39 states to determine their criticality.  The 
objective of these FASCAT assessments was to prioritize the allocation of threat 
mitigation resources to the most critical systems.  Prior to the use of FASCAT, no 
food and agriculture systems were identified as critical in the U.S.  Now with the 
use of FASCAT, many food and agriculture systems have been added to the 
criticality list.  This article discusses why the FASCAT was built, how it has 
evolved, and how the process currently works.  
  13 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 2003, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 established a 
national policy for federal government departments and agencies to identify and 
prioritize United States (U.S.) critical infrastructure and key resources to protect 
them from terrorist attack (Bush, G. W., 2003).  The food and agriculture sector is 
one of eighteen critical sectors that is almost entirely privately owned and is 
composed of an estimated 2.1 million farms, approximately 880,500 companies, 
and over 1 million facilities, and accounts for roughly one-fifth of the U.S. 
economic activity (Department of Homeland Security, 2009d).  The 2009 National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan states that the government and the private sector 
are jointly responsible for protecting complex, globally distributed, and highly 
integrated components of food and agriculture systems (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009c).  This declaration was made due to a widespread 
concern that the food system could be used as a vehicle to poison, maim, or kill 
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people or to cause significant 
economic harm.  The joint responsibility for protecting food and agricultural 
systems requires a partnership between the government and private sector to 
identify critical assets.  Criticality is defined as the negative impact that the 
destruction of a critical infrastructure would have on the nation (Theoharidou, 
Kotzanikolaou, & Gritzalis, 2010). Therefore, protecting those assets by first 
identifying which food and agriculture systems are more critical is essential 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010a).  Furthermore, it is vital to determine 
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which systems are most essential in terms of consequences to public health 
(both psychological and physical), the economy, and the government. 
 The Food and Agriculture Government Coordinating Council and Sector 
Coordinating Council (GCC/SCC) partnered with one of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) Centers’ of Excellence, the National Center for Food 
Protection and Defense (NCFPD), to develop an assessment to assist states in 
determining and documenting the most critical elements, sub-systems, and 
systems within food and agriculture infrastructure (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009c).  The tool developed by NCFPD is called the Food and 
Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT).  FASCAT provides 
state officials responsible for protecting food and agriculture with: (i) a means to 
identify systems that are critical to each state’s commodity supply chains and 
food distribution systems; (ii) a method to prioritize state or private sector 
vulnerability assessments and protective measures for asymmetrical threats to 
food and agriculture systems; (iii) documentation and improved characterization 
of each state’s food and agriculture systems’ risk profile; and, (iv) a method to 
provide critical food and agriculture infrastructure component information to 
DHS’s National Data Call.  
 Unlike many other critical infrastructures (e.g., nuclear reactors, 
government facilities, and dams), states generally do not have system specific 
data on all the elements of the food and agriculture infrastructure.  While most 
food and agriculture facilities are inspected, licensed, and regulated by multiple 
state and federal government agencies, they are owned and operated outside of 
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the government (Stewart & Gostin, 2011).  Consequently, partnerships across 
state agencies and with the private sector are the only way to successfully and 
completely characterize the food and agriculture infrastructures to assess and 
determine which infrastructure systems are the most critical.  FASCAT is an 
assessment of consequence and system characteristics that provides a 
comparative analysis of vastly disparate systems, sub-sectors, and sub-systems 
(e.g., comparing the criticality of the fluid milk system to the potato system) 
(Tuncel & Alpan, 2010).  It is important to realize that FASCAT was not 
developed as a stand-alone risk assessment or vulnerability assessment tool.  
Traditional risk and vulnerability assessments typically focus on individual 
facilities in the food production system, and the results of these assessments do 
not enable the user to make comparisons between systems.  FASCAT considers 
a multitude of factors, which enables users to determine which systems should 
be prioritized for vulnerability assessments, implementation of protective controls, 
risk mitigation, and emergency response planning.  
 To be successful, state officials must engage with representatives from 
multiple government agencies and privately owned food systems operators that 
have direct working knowledge of food and agriculture infrastructure to obtain the 
necessary information to complete criticality assessments (Lemieux & Regens, 
2012; Spink & Moyer, 2011).  Required collaborators may include: agencies 
responsible for agriculture (e.g., inspection program leads, emergency response 
leads), animal health experts (e.g., state veterinarians), environmental scientists, 
public health professionals (e.g., environmental inspectors, foodborne illness 
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outbreak traceback and traceforward investigators, epidemiologists), 
transportation managers, law enforcement personnel, and homeland security 
representatives (Hennessey, Kennedy, & Busta, 2010). Representatives from the 
private sector, or associations that represent the food production systems, must 
be involved in the criticality assessment process, and the criticality assessment 
team should include the companies that own the food system being evaluated 
(e.g., farm bureaus, animal agriculture associations, food processing 
associations, etc.) (Hoffman & Kennedy, 2007). 
 The information generated by FASCAT enables the owners and operators 
of food and agriculture systems to coordinate and collaborate with each other, 
and state and federal government agencies to assist in protecting these critical 
infrastructures.  Based on NCFPD’s evaluation of FASCAT use, the most 
efficient approach to obtain the necessary representatives from the government 
and private sector is to have state governments lead the effort (Huff & Kennedy, 
2012).  In situations where the state officials are not familiar with the food and 
agriculture systems in their state, the first step to successfully completing a 
FASCAT assessment is to conduct a training session with all of the appropriate 
government and private sector leaders to familiarize them with the assessment 
and to review their available food and agriculture systems’ data.  Meeting with 
SMEs and participating in a FASCAT training session may not be required if the 
state officials already have detailed knowledge of the food and agriculture 
systems in their states.  After updating or adding to their food and agriculture 
system data, the second step is to host a working session to populate FASCAT 
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to specify an initial characterization of the infrastructure and to assess what is 
most critical in the state.  Through the use of FASCAT, the sector owners and 
operators, states, and the nation have been able to identify and understand 
which systems are most critical in the food and agriculture sector.  The 
information gained through engagement and FASCAT analysis allows for 
security resources to be focused on increasing the protection of the most critical 
systems from man-made, natural, or accidentally occurring threats (Roberts, 
2007).  When implemented, these efforts will assist in reducing the probability of 
successful use of the food system as a weapon to attack our nation, increase our 
ability to rapidly identify threats to complex food systems, and to assist in 
recovery to normalcy in the event of a successful attack (Kennedy & Busta, 
2007).  While an early limited-application spreadsheet-based version of the tool 
is available to the public on the NCFPD webpage (FASCAT Version 2.0), the 
more advanced, comprehensive, and easy-to-use interface version of the 
FASCAT (Version 3.0) is only available through the protected and secure 
FoodSHIELD web portal.  Because the intended users are state agencies, 
FASCAT Version 3.0 resides in FoodSHIELD to prevent unauthorized or 
malicious people from accessing the potentially sensitive data, and to protect the 
confidentiality of the owners’ data. 
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FASCAT OVERVIEW 
 FASCAT has been used by 39 states to determine and compare the 
criticality of food systems within their jurisdictions, and it was used most heavily 
by states that contain high proportions of the nation’s food and agriculture 
systems (Huff & Kennedy, 2012).  During the FASCAT process, each state’s food 
official gathers the subject matter experts (SMEs) for each commodity within their 
state (e.g., milk, eggs, grain, frozen pizza, pasta sauce).  Often the SMEs are 
employees of the companies that own the food system being evaluated or 
regulators from state or local government agencies.  Typically, SMEs are the 
best source of information related to prioritization of food system and production 
risks (Bertolini, Antonio, & Maurizio, 2007).  First, the state officials ask questions 
provided by the FASCAT to the SMEs (e.g., the type of food system, threats, 
consequences, impacts of disaster, probability of the threats, footprint of a 
disaster).  After SMEs are asked questions, the SMEs debate among each other 
until a consensus can be obtained for each commodity and question in the 
FASCAT.  When consensus is reached, the state official responsible for food and 
agriculture protection records the agreed-upon answer in the FASCAT software.  
As the answers to questions are recorded in FASCAT, the commodity’s criticality 
score is calculated by the software and is displayed as each question is 
answered, until all of the questions in FASCAT are completed.  Typically, the first 
FASCAT assessment takes state officials and industry SMEs approximately 3 
hours to complete.  As familiarity and proficiency with the FASCAT method 
increases, subsequent assessments typically take an hour or less.  Despite the 
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opportunity cost associated with learning the FASCAT, it was used in over 731 
food systems criticality assessments throughout the U.S. 
FASCAT Version 1.0 & 2.0 
 FASCAT has been revised twice since it was first developed.  All versions 
of FASCAT were developed in cooperation with food industry, government, and 
academic SMEs.  FASCAT Version 1.0 and 2.0 were constructed using a 
commercially available spreadsheet and collected food systems characteristics 
data (e.g., commodity type, threat profile, state government point of contact), 
which would generate a score on an ordinal scale between 0 and 200.  The score 
generated by FASCAT 1.0 enabled state officials to compare disparate food 
systems to select systems to protect first.  Then, the scores could be used to 
prioritize vulnerability assessments, protective measures, and threat mitigation 
strategies.  FASCAT Version 1.0 was used for 2 years and was decommissioned 
after the development of FASCAT Version 2.0.  Retrospectively, the data 
collected by FASCAT Version 1.0 did not meet the requirements of measuring 
criticality due to broad generalizations and the lack of variation in threats and 
consequences.  Later, in FASCAT Version 3.0, threats and consequences were 
more clearly defined and accounted for all of the elements that SMEs believed to 
contribute to food and agriculture systems’ criticality.  The lack of operational 
definitions of key terms in FASCAT 1.0 probably contributed to poor inter-rater 
and test-retest reliability and increased the potential or facilitator/trainer bias; 
however, development of the first version of FASCAT enabled state governments 
to begin thinking critically about their food and agriculture production systems.  
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The lack of sufficient variability in food system characterization in Version 1.0 
(e.g., system description, threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities) reduced the 
users’ ability to effectively discriminate between disparate systems.  Version 2.0 
had many new additions and revisions (i.e., additional commodity flow charts, 
enhanced threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities), which enabled users to 
adequately characterize food systems, and enabled FASCAT to better 
discriminate between closely related food systems.  As a result of these 
improvements, FASCAT was better able to identify which food systems were the 
most critical to the states. 
 
FASCAT VERSION 3.0 
 In 2010, the FASCAT received many updates and revisions.  This was 
partly to minimize the immense data-reporting burden on state government 
agencies, and remedy the difficulty in manipulating FASCAT 2.0’s spreadsheets.  
During FASCAT 3.0 development, FASCAT’s users (state officials) were required 
to continue their annual submission of data to the DHS’s Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (IP).  To comply with IP’s Annual Data Call, state governments are 
required to report critical infrastructure information to IP on all 18 critical 
infrastructure sectors, and the reporting of critical infrastructures information is a 
monumental and time consuming task for state officials.  NCFPD sought to 
minimize the burden on state officials for reporting food and agriculture critical 
infrastructure information to DHS through FASCAT.  FASCAT 3.0 was able to 
overcome the challenge of assembling complex and analogous data consistently 
by developing a single software platform for identification, analysis, and 
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comparison of systems’ criticality for the state’s submission to DHS.  FASCAT 
3.0 software provided a standardized format to identify, collect, and record food 
systems data, a process to convert recorded data to a standardized reporting 
format, and a method to characterize and calculate food systems criticality. 
Taxonomy 
 One of the problems in reporting data to the federal government is that 
different federal agencies use different terminology and taxonomies to describe 
food and agriculture production. It was difficult for state officials to determine the 
correct terminology for reporting to each federal entity.  The U.S. government’s 
data reporting requirements led to the development of resources like the 
Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT) and the Infrastructure Data Collection 
Application (IDCA) tool (Department of Homeland Security. 2010b).  The IDT 
standardized the language used to describe critical infrastructures for the state 
governments and the IDCA made the transfer of information from states to IP an 
easier process.  To compare similar infrastructures, IDT was developed by IP to 
ensure that similar infrastructure components were identified similarly between 
states (e.g., maize processing and corn processing).  By using a common 
terminology and method for categorizing information, the IDT allows critical 
infrastructure data to be more easily compared and contrasted by the federal 
government.  FASCAT uses the IDT to ensure that consistent terminology 
between state and federal agencies is used when identifying the food system 
being evaluated for criticality.  Thus, state officials only need to identify the 
system in FASCAT, and then FASCAT translates the selected food type to the 
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terminology used by each federal entity.  This FASCAT upgrade ensured that all 
of the parties involved were using similar nomenclature, saved government 
entities time, and was essential to effectively determining food and agriculture 
criticality. 
Data Reporting 
 NCFPD further reduced the burden on state officials by enabling FASCAT 
Version 3.0 to create IDCA reporting forms for state officials.  As users complete 
the FASCAT assessment, the IDCA preamble, assessment, and justification 
scenario is created under the IDT taxonomy.  In Version 3.0, the user can then 
download the finished IDCA document.  This helped state officials collaborate 
with the sector specific agencies or state and territorial homeland security 
advisors to nominate their food and agriculture systems for selection as a DHS 
Level 1 or Level 2 Critical Infrastructure Key Resource (CIKR) asset.  In some 
cases, the nomination as a DHS Level 1or 2 CIKR asset resulted in the federal 
government’s assistance in securing the asset by providing additional security 
resources.  The ability of FASCAT 3.0 to generate the IDCA report saved many 
state government agencies’ and food defense managers’ time by quickly 
characterizing their food systems’ characteristics and threat profile, and then 
providing the characteristics in the IDCA reporting format.  
Data Collection 
 FASCAT was converted from a spreadsheet-based tool to a web-based 
graphic user interface (GUI) to ease the collection of data, to improve the quality 
and consistency of the data collected, and to make the entry of data more 
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intuitive for the FASCAT’s users.  Additionally, more detailed commodity flow 
charts that illustrated the food system supply chains and manufacturing 
processes were included as a reference in FASCAT Version 3.0 to assist state 
officials in identifying, characterizing, and evaluating the criticality of food 
systems in their jurisdictions.  
 State officials collect data on a wide array of food systems and they also 
collect the system operators’ contact information.  The collected information is 
used to calculate and compare systems criticality, and to develop an emergency 
contact list.  Also, the data collection process of FASCAT fosters communication 
between the private sector systems operators, commodity specific subject matter 
experts (SME), and state officials, and is essential for rapid and effective 
communication with the food industry in case of an intentional contamination 
event (Glass, et al., 2011).  While the ability to characterize food systems is 
important to determine food and agriculture systems’ criticality, having a unified, 
independent, and secure database of food systems owners and operators helps 
facilitate communication between the private sector and state officials in the 
event of unintentional or intentional contamination of food systems (Degeneffe, 
Kinsey, Stinson, & Ghosh, 2009).  By establishing relationships with SMEs and 
systems owners and operators, and by collecting and storing their contact 
information through FASCAT, people responsible for food defense are able to 
rapidly identify and communicate with the necessary people during unintentional 
or intentional food contamination events. 
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System Characterization  
 To characterize the criticality of a system, FASCAT collects information 
detailing the food product types within the system.  These food products could be 
processed foods like canned vegetables, pasta sauce, or frozen pizza, or they 
could be minimally processed foods like fresh produce, chicken broilers, or 
ground beef.  During this step in the FASCAT process, the number of facilities in 
the supply chain is recorded from farm to fork.  This can be useful to estimate the 
size of system in combination with other factors and data collected in FASCAT.  
After the system being evaluated is identified in FASCAT, the program uses this 
information to weight the criticality score.  The weighted criticality score may be 
useful in differentiating systems criticality by spreading out the distribution of 
scores; however, FASCAT also calculates a cumulative criticality score where 
weighting by commodity type does not occur.  This gives the state official 
responsible for food and agriculture defense the ability to give preference to 
theoretically risky or fragile systems, or to compare systems without a priori 
knowledge using the cumulative score.  In either case, FASCAT provides a 
means to compare the criticality of disparate systems. 
  
  25 
Criticality Scoring 
 After the type of system is identified and recorded in the database, 
FASCAT uses an all hazards approach to determine system criticality.  
Specifically, FASCAT enables the users to examine and determine the likely 
threats, initial consequences, 2nd and 3rd order consequences, and the impacts 
that an attack or disaster would have on the system.  In FASCAT, the users are 
able to select multiple possible threats to the system being evaluated (e.g., 
foreign animal disease, chemical/toxin, plant pests, pathogen contamination, 
cyber threat).  As each threat is selected, points are added to the cumulative 
criticality score, and the amount of points assigned for each threat is based upon 
the severity of the threat to the selected commodity (e.g., if fluid milk was being 
evaluated and chemical/toxin was selected, the cumulative score would increase 
by 3).  Threats that are not plausible for the selected commodity are inactivated 
by the software and cannot be selected.  For example, if fluid milk is the system 
being evaluated, a user cannot select plant disease as a primary threat, which 
prevents users from gaming the tool by selecting all of the threats to the 
commodity to increase the food system’s criticality score.  After the threats are 
selected the users may justify their threat selections or provide any additional 
pertinent information in an open text comment box.  Similarly, the user repeats 
this process for consequences (e.g., loss of tourism, long term shutdown, 
economic loss, mass human casualties), and 2nd and 3rd order consequences 
(e.g., damage to tax base, disease spread to others, loss of public confidence) 
and selection of these factors increases the cumulative and weighted scores.  
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The process of selecting the impacts of the attack or disaster is similar to the 
previously described threat selection process (e.g., greater than 1 year to 
recover, at least 10,000 human casualties, more than 5 states impacted); 
however, the factors selected have a multiplicative effect on the weighted score 
which measures the size of the footprint of the consequences and helps 
determine if the food and agriculture system meets the criticality thresholds 
defined by the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 
(e.g., when a specific food system is being evaluated and 10,000 human 
casualties is selected and more than 5 states impacted is selected under 
impacts, the weighted score increases by 1.75 times).  The cumulative and 
weighted scoring process within FASCAT is completely transparent as each 
manipulation of any factor immediately changes the scores and the scores are 
continuously displayed. 
 After these data are collected, FASCAT prompts the user for information 
on the ease of attack (i.e., low, medium, high), probability of disaster (i.e., low, 
medium, high), scale/size of component at risk (i.e., small, mid-size, large, very 
large, more than 5 states), recovery/return to normalcy (e.g., less than 3 months 
to not probable), and concentration (i.e., highly concentrated, moderately 
concentrated, dispersed within a region, widely dispersed, less than three total 
components).  All of these data contribute to the criticality score in an additive 
fashion.  The ability to collect these types of data on complex food systems and 
characterize food systems in terms of their unique threats, consequences, and 
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impacts enables FASCAT to compare the criticality of disparate food systems on 
an ordinal scale. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The NCFPD developed the FASCAT to assist states in objectively 
determining which food systems were the most critical to the nation to protect 
them from terrorist attacks.  Since FASCAT was developed, it has been used in 
over 731 criticality assessments in 39 states to identify, document, evaluate, and 
compare disparate complex food systems, which resulted in the addition of 
multiple food and agriculture systems to the DHS critical infrastructure list for the 
first time in history.  Some of the food systems analyzed with FASCAT received 
additional resources from DHS to mitigate potential food defense threats.  
FASCAT enables its users to determine systems’ criticality and then prioritize the 
allocation of food defense resources or threat mitigation strategies.   
 FASCAT has several limitations.  First, the use of subject matter expertise 
to determine the probability of threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and 
magnitude of systems failures needs to be validated.  The probability of large-
scale naturally occurring threats (i.e., hurricanes, and floods) can be determined 
using more objective methods (e.g., spatial risk analysis) instead of relying on the 
subject matter experts’ subjective opinions.  Potentially, the group consensus 
method used in FASCAT was biased by groupthink, or influenced by subject 
matter experts with strong personalities.  If future research discovers that these 
two limitations of FASCAT substantially affect the outcomes of FASCAT analysis, 
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then alternatives to the use of subject matter experts to quantify criticality need to 
be explored. 
 Despite FASCAT’s limitations, FASCAT cannot be conventionally 
validated without a series of catastrophic events.  Instead, the FASCAT data can 
be used to determine FASCAT’s reliability, construct validity, content validity, and 
internal validity.  Fortunately, the broad use of FASCAT across multiple 
production systems, commodity types, and geographic areas allows the collected 
data to be analyzed and tested.  The ongoing analysis of the FASCAT process 
and data will help determine if the FASCAT method is valid and of value to its 
users.  Even though FASCAT has not yet been empirically validated, NCFPD has 
continued to make improvements to FASCAT.  To better meet the food defense 
needs of state officials and the private sector.  Future research needs to be 
conducted to determine if the FASCAT method is a reliable measure of criticality, 
and to determine if bias or significant sources of error exist in the FASCAT 
process.  Although FASCAT has imperfections, it has greatly helped the federal 
and state governments identify critical food and agriculture systems as part of 
how they dedicate precious resources to protect them from adverse events. 
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Chapter Three: State Officials’ Perceptions of the Food and 
Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT), Food-
system Risk, and Food Defense Funding 
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Determining food system criticality is necessary to mitigate risks to the nation’s 
food supply and prioritize and allocate funding. The Food and Agriculture Sector 
Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) is a tool used broadly by state 
governments to determine the criticality of food systems throughout the U.S.  
State officials (SOs) responsible for food defense (n = 32) were surveyed to 
determine whether FASCAT is of value to food defense and to determine SOs’ 
security beliefs, values, and practices related to food defense.  Results indicated 
that: (1) SOs believe FASCAT is easier to use than other forms of risk 
assessment; (2) FASCAT training may have introduced bias into assessment of 
probability, threat, vulnerability, and consequences; (3) FASCAT is valuable to 
SOs; (4) SOs do not routinely follow security management best practices; (5) 
SOs believe that intentional biological threats to the food system are the most 
probable threats, though without supporting evidence; and (6) SOs believe food 
defense risk mitigation is not adequately funded by state or federal governments.  
These findings indicate that even though bias was potentially introduced to 
FASCAT assessments, SOs believe FASCAT has been useful to determine food 
system criticality.  SOs indicate that more funding is needed from state and 
federal governments to adequately mitigate and manage food defense risks, and 
that they require more comprehensive training from food defense subject matter 
experts in threat assessment, risk mitigation, and security management to reduce 
the possibility of bias from FASCAT training.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 United States’ (U.S.) food systems are vulnerable to disruption.  For 
example, the Department of Homeland Security is concerned that a hurricane 
could destroy areas vital to the food supply chain, that floods or drought could 
make inoperable the dams necessary for the transportation of food, or that the 
food system could be used as the delivery mechanism for a terrorist attack.  To 
identity and mitigate these risks, food systems must be analyzed to identify 
relevant threats, estimate probabilities of identified threats, identify the magnitude 
of consequences of these likely threats, and then assign criticality scores to 
enable comparison of disparate food systems.  Many types of risk assessment 
are used in food defense, but the final goal of these tools should be to directly 
compare different food system types to prioritize allocation of scarce security 
resources.  Food systems are national in scale and connect across state 
boundaries.  However, individual states are responsible for reporting critical 
infrastructure to the Department of Homeland Security. 
 Nearly all states have an employee responsible for food defense.  State 
officials (SOs) responsible for food defense share responsibility for protecting 
U.S. food systems.  These SOs serve as arbiters and intercessors between the 
federal government and private sector food firms on food defense, security, and 
preparedness issues.  Often, SOs work closely with private sector food firms, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure 
protection of food systems within their states (Food and Drug Administration, 
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2008).  SOs nurture productive partnerships with these federal government 
agencies by establishing food defense best practices, reaching out to the food 
industry, and facilitating information sharing between food firms and the federal 
government.  They allocate and coordinate allocation of government security and 
food defense resources to food and agriculture (e.g., security training, 
specialized equipment, and analysis methods), which enhances the resilience of 
food systems.  SOs accomplish these tasks with limited funds by leveraging and 
using food protection tools and resources (Read & Starkey, 2012). 
 State officials can use software tools (e.g., Organization Risk 
Management, CARVER + Shock, and FASCAT) to help gather and share food 
system information.  However, software can be difficult to use and may be 
subject to user error and biases.  Software usability surveys are intended to 
assess the ability of users to complete tasks using the software, the quality of the 
software’s output, the levels of human and computational resources consumed 
performing tasks, and the users’ subjective reactions to the software (ISO, 1998).  
Many software usability surveys since the mid 1990s have suggested problems 
with navigation, interpretation, and data entry.  These surveys have used Likert 
scales to assess user satisfaction and effectiveness and efficiency of the 
software (Brooke, 1996). 
 Software usability is typically easy to test and correct, but in software 
assessment the user must also be objective and unbiased.  Few people in the 
U.S., if any, have any firsthand knowledge of the actual probability of terrorist 
threats facing the U.S. food system (Brown & Cox Jr., 2011).  No one knows 
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what destructive acts terrorists are covertly planning in their homes.  For many, 
knowledge of terrorist threat probability is restricted to information obtained via 
open sources of unknown validity.  When terrorist threat information is perceived 
to be inadequate, individuals often search to find additional information.  
However, by the time new threat information is discovered it is often too late to 
take action to mitigate risks (Fischer, Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, Fischer, Frey, 
& Crelley, 2011). 
 Even if SOs routinely engaged in food defense and security management 
best practices, they may have individual cognitive biases related to risk 
perception (e.g., availability heuristic, belief bias, and subjective validation) 
(Lemyr, Turner, Lee, & Krewski, 2006).  If food industry SMEs and SOs share 
similar cognitive biases regarding perceived risks, then biased data could be 
entered into software tools without being adequately challenged or evaluated by 
a peer review process.  Biases regarding threat, probability of occurrence, and 
severity of impact is highly problematic because such inaccurate risk perceptions 
could distort results and impact mitigation strategies.  These pooled cognitive 
biases could lead SOs to emphasize less probable food contamination event 
types and thus implement risk management strategies that are not effective 
against more probable but overlooked event types (e.g., chemical or physical 
contamination), thus reducing preparedness and response effectiveness.  
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 Food defense and security management plans are only as effective as the 
strength of underlying risk and criticality assessments (Franco & Sell, 2012).  
SOs and SMEs must engage in security management and food defense best 
practices to effectively mitigate intentional food system threats (Manning, Baines, 
& Chadd, 2005).  Even if SOs are using tools to mitigate risk, they need to 
evaluate the risks of each food system separately, implement threat mitigation 
technologies and strategies for each food system, and reevaluate risks to food 
systems after threat mitigation.  Only by routinely engaging in security 
management and food defense best practices will SOs and SMEs be able to 
reduce risks to food systems. 
 Security management and food defense research and practice often 
require funding from the U.S. government.  Accordingly, the government has 
invested many millions of dollars in food defense initiatives.  For example, in 
2008 the USDA received $91 million, in 2009 the FDA received $42 million, and 
in 2009 the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) received $51 million for 
enhancement of their food and agricultural defense initiatives (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2001).  To have an effective food defense strategy, 
resources are required for private and public sector food defense education and 
to develop risk mitigation technologies and deploy them to private food 
companies and state governments.  With large amounts of money appropriated 
to federal agencies for food defense, it is imperative to determine if investments 
in critical infrastructures were appropriately allocated.  This study examines the 
usability and value of one software tool, the Food and Agriculture Systems 
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Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) by studying SOs and potential biases 
introduced during FASCAT training and use.   
 
BACKGROUND 
 The Food and Agriculture Systems Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) 
is software developed by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense 
(NCFPD).  FASCAT is leveraged and promoted extensively to the food industry 
by SOs to measure the criticality of their food systems.  Despite the widespread 
use of FASCAT by SOs, there has been concern among the scientific community 
and federal government agencies that FASCAT’s application to food systems 
could potentially result in biased criticality scores (Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & 
Kennedy, 2013). 
FASCAT Training and Data Collection Process  
 From 2008 to 2012, food industry subject matter experts (SMEs) and SOs 
were provided FASCAT guidance documents and received in-person FASCAT 
training from National Center of Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) and DHS 
staff during the FASCAT data collection process (Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & 
Kennedy, 2013).  During the training sessions, NCFPD and DHS staff, the SOs, 
and food industry experts used a crawl, walk, and run training method to teach 
the FASCAT process while completing actual FASCAT assessments.  This 
instruction process involved a guided discussion with SOs and SMEs related to 
probability of attack, specific threats, ease of access to food systems’ critical 
control points, and the consequences of a failure to these food systems and 
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society.  Occasionally, SMEs and SOs did not come to consensus on responses 
to questions in FASCAT.  In these cases, NCFPD and DHS trainers offered 
suggestions on how to respond to questions in FASCAT, possibly introducing 
facilitator bias into assessment of attack threat type and probability, ease of 
attack, and attack consequences.  Some of the results from FASCAT 
assessments completed during NCFPD and DHS training sessions were 
submitted to DHS as justification for nomination of food systems as critical 
infrastructure.  This is problematic because potentially biased FASCAT results 
could have omitted some critical food systems from DHS consideration as a 
critical infrastructure. 
Potential Biases 
 Combining training and data collection sessions was a reasonable and 
efficient approach in the training of SOs in FASCAT use and the collection of 
FASCAT data from SMEs (Torkzadeh, Pflughoeft, & Hall, 1999).  However, the 
combined training and data collection method potentially introduced observer and 
social biases (Da Cunha, Stedefeldt, & De Rosso, 2012).  If SOs and SMEs had 
limited access to valid or reliable food system threat probability information, 
NCFPD and DHS trainers could potentially introduce social bias through 
cognitive distortions (Dalziel, 2011).  For example, it was directly observed that 
some NCFPD and DHS trainers oversimplified terrorist threats to make them 
more compelling to the audience, behavior that numerous psychological and 
security training studies have shown can elicit confirmation bias (Chadwick & 
Edwards, 2009; Greitzer, Andrews, Herz, & Wolf, 2010; James, Demaree, & 
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Wolf, 1984; Salmon, Park, & Wrigley. 2003; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & 
Moscovici, 2000).  These information biases presented by NCFPD and DHS 
trainers could potentially cause SMEs to provide biased responses to SOs during 
or after FASCAT training.  If this did in fact happen, then this would produce 
biased FASCAT results.   
 
STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 The usability and value of FASCAT software, SOs’ risk perceptions, and 
food defense practices of SOs were examined.  No previous studies have 
evaluated how SMEs are used to collect data related to risk or criticality 
assessment, or how information presented during risk or criticality assessment 
training could bias SMEs’ and SOs’ food systems criticality assessments.  
Furthermore, few studies have examined the risk perceptions of SOs, their 
beliefs about levels of funding for food defense, and their self reported food 
defense and security management practices.  Rather, most studies have focused 
on retail managers’ or consumers’ perception of risk (Yoon & Shanklin, 2007).  
Specifically, the present study aimed to: (1) directly examine the usability of 
FASCAT software; (2) measure FASCAT’s perceived value among SOs; (3) 
determine if social biases could have been introduced to SOs during the 
FASCAT training and data collection process; (4) evaluate SOs’ risk perceptions; 
(5) evaluate SOs’ perception of the adequacy of their funding; and (6) assess 
SOs’ food defense management practices to determine if they are congruent with 
security management best practices.   
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 Hypotheses were: (1) SOs would find FASCAT software simple to use; (2) 
FASCAT would be of value to SOs; (3) practices that could introduce social 
biases were present during the FASCAT training and data collection process; (4) 
SOs’ would perceive equal probability of biological and chemical risks to the food 
system; (5) food defense is perceived as adequately funded by SOs; and (6) SOs 
have strong security management practices. 
 
METHOD 
Participants  
 The study population consisted of 91 government managers responsible 
for food defense in 2012, who were invited to participate in the study based on 
their identification as the designated SO in NCFPD’s FoodSHIELD database.  
Because the study was completely anonymous, the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus, ruled it exempt from 
IRB review process.  In accordance with standard research protocol, participants 
had to read a paragraph that stated the purpose and volunteer nature of the 
study and consent to the survey before any data were collected.  Participants 
who completed the electronic survey were included in the study (n = 32).  
Participants were not compensated in any way.  During construction of the 
survey, one investigator (AGH) traveled with NCFPD and DHS trainers to 
observe four training sessions to determine if social biases were present and to 
inform survey construction. 
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Materials 
 An email containing a hyperlink to the electronic survey was sent to all 
SOs in the FoodSHIELD database (n = 91).  The survey was constructed to 
measure the participants’ perceptions of FASCAT’s usability and value, the 
potential for the introduction of social biases to SOs during FASCAT training 
sessions, SOs’ risk perceptions to threats, SOs’ perceptions of food defense and 
security funding, and SOs’ food defense practices.  
Procedure 
 Survey data were stored in an Internet hosted spreadsheet prior to 
analysis.  FASCAT social bias questions were asked in a closed format (yes/no), 
and the remainder of the survey questions required participants to rank their 
degree of agreement with the provided statements on a 1 to 5 Likert scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 3 = neither disagree/nor agree, and 5 = strongly agreed.  
Participants’ survey responses were tested to assess whether their perceptions 
differed on average from the suggested non-committal value of 3.   
 All statistical tests were completed with SPSS 19 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA).  All questions were analyzed using one-sample t-tests, which measures if 
SOs tended to differ from the suggested Likert scale non-committal value of 3.  
Since the electronic survey forced participants to answer all questions, there was 
no variation in the response rate between questions.  Thus, no data were 
excluded from the analysis. 
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RESULTS 
Response Rate 
 Of the 91 state officials responsible for food defense invited to complete 
the online survey, 32 people responded and completed the survey.  Ten of the 91 
emails sent were returned as undeliverable.  All of the responses were usable, 
yielding a response rate of 39.5%.   
Demographics 
 Demographic data were not collected to prevent identification of specific 
SOs’ responses to sensitive security questions.  By making the survey 
completely anonymous, response bias due to fear of reprisal for releasing 
sensitive or discommodious information among SOs was reduced (Jensen, Li, & 
Rahman, 2010).  The contact list of state FASCAT users was obtained from the 
FoodSHIELD database (n = 91).  By examining the demographic data available 
in the database, some generalizations can be made about the survey population.  
The people sent the survey were predominantly male (n 71%), and used 
FASCAT at varying rates.  Based on job titles available in the FoodSHIELD 
database, 19% of the people in the FoodSHIELD database were security 
managers (n = 17), 15% were program administrators (n = 14), 14% were 
government veterinarians (n = 13), 13% were emergency managers (n = 12), and 
39% did not report their job title (n = 35).  
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Survey Results 
 SOs were neutral in their review of FASCAT usability (Table I).  There 
were no significant differences from the non-committal value of 3 regarding 
FASCAT usability.  SOs are generally using the FASCAT food systems flow 
charts (Item 5, Mean  = 1.81, t = -7.82, p < .001), and SOs judged that FASCAT 
was easier to use than other forms of risk assessment (Item 2, Mean  = 3.28, t = 
2.06, p = .048). 
 
Table I: FASCAT’s Usability 
Item 
 
t p value Mean SE 
1. Compared to other forms of risk assessment, 
the FASCAT tool is easier to understand. 
.892 .379 3.13 .140 
2. Compared to other forms of risk assessment, 
the FASCAT tool is much easier to use. 
2.06 .048* 3.28 .136 
3. FASCAT is very easy to use. .649 .521 3.09 .145 
4. The FASCAT flow charts contained complete 
and accurate supply chain data. 
1.60 .118 3.25 .156 
5. The FASCAT flow charts were not used 
during the assessment. 
-7.82 < .001* 1.81 .152 
6. The FASCAT instructions were easy to 
understand. 
3.04 .005* 3.41 .134 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
 
 SOs’ evaluation of FASCAT’s value did differ from the neutral value of 3 
(Table II).  SOs judged that FASCAT aids them in identifying critical food systems 
(Item 3, Mean  = 3.84, t = 5.40, p < .001), aids them in identifying vulnerable food 
systems (Item 2, Mean  = 3.47, t = 2.79, p = .009), enhances their understanding 
of the commodity supply chain (Item 8, Mean  = 4.00, t = 7.87, p < .001), and 
enables their organizations to complete criticality assessments for food and 
agriculture (Item 4, Mean  = 4.21, t = 7.39, p = < .001). 
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Table II: FASCAT’s Value 
Item t p value Mean SE 
1. Compared to other forms of risk assessment, the 
FASCAT tool is more valuable. 
2.18 .037* 3.28 .129 
2. FASCAT helps my organization determine the 
specific food systems that are the most vulnerable 
to an attack.  
 
2.79 
 
.009* 
 
3.47 
 
.168 
3. FASCAT helps our organization identify critical 
infrastructures. 
5.40 < .001* 3.84 .156 
4. FASCAT is a valuable tool that enables my 
organization to complete critical infrastructure 
assessments for food and agriculture. 
7.39 < .001* 4.21 .164 
5. My organization does not understand what the 
FASCAT scores represent. 
-1.79 .083 2.63 .209 
6. My organization is extremely dissatisfied with 
FASCAT. 
-7.00 <.001* 2.13 .125 
7. Our organization is extremely satisfied with 
FASCAT. 
2.25 .032* 3.34 .153 
8. The FASCAT flow charts enhanced my 
organization's understanding of the commodity 
supply chain. 
7.87 < .001* 4.00 .127 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
 
 SOs judged that they were in a position to be biased by NCFPD and DHS 
trainers (Table III): 1) 87.5% of the SOs surveyed received in-person assistance 
while conducting FASCAT assessments; 2) 50.0% of SOs reported receiving 
help from somebody that might have influenced their responses to FASCAT; 3) 
78.1% of SOs received help completing FASCAT assessments from others who 
were trained by NCFPD staff; and 4) 75.0% of SOs received training from 
NCFPD. 
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Table III: Potential Sources of Bias 
Item % Yes  
1.  Did you receive help in person from the National Center for Food Protection and 
Defense’s (NCFPD) staff while using FASCAT? 
87.5 
2.  Did you receive help via telephone from the National Center for Food Protection 
and Defense’s (NCFPD) staff, Core-shield Staff, or anybody else that might 
have influenced your answers while using FASCAT? 
 
50.0 
3.  Did you receive help while using FASCAT from a person who previously was 
trained by NCFPD’s staff on how to use FASCAT? 
78.1 
4. During your FASCAT session, did anyone participating in the risk assessment 
receive any kind of training from the National Center for Food Protection and 
Defense (NCFPD)? 
75.0 
 
 
 SOs’ risk perceptions differed from the suggested neutral value of 3 (Table 
IV).  SOs believe that food and agriculture systems are at high risk of 
unintentional contamination (Item 3, Mean  = 1.47, t = -15.28, p < .001) and 
biological terrorist attack (Item 2, Mean  = 1.50, t = -11.17, p < .001), but they 
tend not to believe that food and agriculture are at high risk of chemical terrorist 
attack (Item 1, Mean  = 3.28, t = 1.47, p = .152).  SOs tend to be neutral about 
whether their organizations understand the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (Item 4, Mean  = 3.44, t = 2.03, p = .051) (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). 
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Table IV: State Officials' Risk Perceptions 
Item t p value Mean SE 
1. Food and agriculture are at high risk   
of a chemical terrorist attack. 
1.47 .152 3.28 .192 
2. Food and agriculture are not at much 
risk of a biological terrorist attack. 
-11.17 < .001* 1.50 .135 
3. Food and agriculture are not at risk 
of unintentional food contamination 
(i.e., E–coli). 
-15.28 < .001* 1.47 .100 
4. My organization’s risk assessment 
team knows and understands the 
National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan. 
2.03 .051 3.44 .215 
5. The risk scores that FASCAT 
generates are not realistic. 
-.812 .423 2.88 .154 
6. The scores that FASCAT generates 
make sense. 
3.26 .003* 3.44 .134 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
 
 
 SOs’ food defense practices differed from the neutral value of 3 (Table V).  
SOs are conducting risk assessments as a food defense or security strategy 
(Item 4, Mean  = 3.56, t = 3.14, p = .004); however, SOs do not describe 
themselves as being zealous in mitigating the risks identified by FASCAT (Item 2, 
Mean  = 3.25, t = 1.28, p = .211).  When risks are identified by FASCAT, SOs 
perceive that they do not have the funding to mitigate risks (Item 3, Mean  = 1.84, 
t = -7.11, p < .001), and states are not conducting secondary FASCAT 
assessments after mitigation strategies are employed (Item 1, Mean  = 2.22, t = -
5.58, p < .001). 
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Table V: State Officials’ Practices and Funding 
Item t p value Mean SE 
1. After risk mitigation strategies are 
employed, my organization conducts a 
second risk assessment with FASCAT. 
-5.58 < .001* 2.22 .140 
2. My organization attempts to mitigate the 
risks identified by FASCAT. 
1.28 .211 3.25 .196 
3. My organization has the funding to mitigate 
the risks identified by FASCAT. 
-7.11 < .001* 1.84 .163 
4. Risk assessment is a major part of my 
organization's security management 
strategy. 
3.14 .004* 3.56 .179 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results indicated that: (1) FASCAT is easier to use than other forms of 
risk assessment; (2) bias in assessment of probability, threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences may have been introduced by the NCFPD and DHS trainers 
during FASCAT training; (3) FASCAT is valuable to SOs; (4) SOs do not report 
routinely following security management best practices; (5) SOs inaccurately 
believe that the food system is at high risk from intentional biological threats; and 
(6) SOs believe that food defense risk mitigation is not adequately funded by 
state or federal governments.  
FASCAT Usability 
 Determining the usability of risk or criticality assessment software is 
important.  By determining food defense software usability, adoption rates of 
software can be partially estimated (Ammenwerth, Iller, & Mahler, 2006).  There 
have been no known usability studies of current food defense risk or criticality 
assessment software (e.g., Food Defense TQ, Food Defense Assessment Tool, 
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CARVER + Shock, and FASCAT).  SOs reported that FASCAT’s instructions 
were easy to understand and that FASCAT was easier to use than other forms of 
food defense risk or criticality assessment, but did not find FASCAT exceptionally 
easy to use.  Improvements to the interface that make navigation of FASCAT 
simpler and reducing the number of open text fields will enhance the usability of 
FASCAT.  While no analysis was performed of the usefulness of the floating 
boxes that provide FASCAT users with operational definitions of terms used in 
FASCAT, future research should be conducted to determine the effectiveness of 
the floating boxes’ definitions in clarifying potentially ambiguous terminology.  
Several SOs directly communicated to us that the display of supply chain 
flowcharts was of great value to SOs and industry during FASCAT assessments.  
The commodity supply chain flowcharts were used often, but they did not always 
contain information that accurately described the commodity or food product 
being evaluated.  This is problematic because inaccurate flow charts could 
potentially cause SOs to incorrectly characterize the food commodity being 
evaluated, leading to biased information for FASCAT analysis.  Additional and 
more accurate commodity flowcharts should be available in FASCAT to improve 
its overall usability. 
FASCAT’s Value 
 SOs and industry have multiple food defense risk and criticality 
assessment software platforms to choose from (e.g., Food Defense TQ, Food 
Defense Assessment Tool, CARVER + Shock, and FASCAT) (Yadav & Sharma, 
2010).  Despite the plethora of assessment tools, no analyses of the value of 
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these products to SOs or industry have been published in refereed journals.  This 
study found that SOs are satisfied with FASCAT and perceive FASCAT to be of 
more value than other forms of risk assessment.  Specifically, FASCAT enables 
SOs to identify critical food and agriculture systems and to determine which food 
systems are most vulnerable to attack.  The systems perspective used in 
FASCAT, to the degree that the commodity flow charts were accurate and were 
used, enhanced SOs’ understanding of the commodity supply chain and food 
system distinctively compared to other food defense software.  Most importantly, 
FASCAT enables SOs to comply with DHS directives and federal government 
critical infrastructure regulations, and to develop new and meaningful 
relationships with food systems owners (Slenning & Tickel, 2010).  
Possible FASCAT Bias 
 During the observation of multiple training sessions conducted by NCFPD 
and DHS, this study observed that NCFPD and DHS trainers behaved in ways 
that may have introduced unwanted cognitive and social biases.  Before SOs 
entered data into FASCAT, NCFPD and DHS trainers routinely engaged in 
conversations with SOs and food industry SMEs that appeared to affect the way 
that SOs responded to FASCAT assessments.  For example, when the group 
was slow to respond, the DHS or NCFPD trainer would tell the group what the 
most probable threats and consequences were.  As in numerous psychological 
studies, these facilitator biases became more prevalent in the afternoon as the 
group fatigued, or became stressed, or when there was an unusual amount of 
controversy within the group (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & 
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Macgregor-Morris, 1990).  Additionally, this study observed that individuals with 
dominant personality types would persuade other group members to support 
their position, thus defying the consensus required for a valid assessment.  
During these arguments, individuals that did not have argumentative or dominant 
personality types would defer to the de facto group leader.  These observations 
are consistent with earlier findings regarding group consensus methods (Mullen, 
2003).  These procedural problems were observed during FASCAT training 
sessions, which could mean that most FASCAT assessments did not reflect an 
independent determination of the food system’s criticality.  However, this 
procedural problem is not unique to FASCAT; all other food defense software 
relies upon similar subjective metrics, subject matter expertise, or group 
consensus.  In the future, having each member of the group submit answers to 
FASCAT questions independently could eliminate these unwanted procedural 
problems.  Specifically, after the group discusses each question the software 
could be modified to average the group’s scoring of the perceived threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences, thus eliminating some of the aspects of these 
procedural problems. 
 The survey indicated that the used procedures had a high potential to bias 
SOs during the FASCAT training and assessment sessions.  Most of the SOs 
(78.1%, Table III) reported that they either received help from NCFPD trainers 
before or during FASCAT use.  This is problematic because NCFPD trainers had 
the greatest potential to bias SOs and FASCAT assessments during that 
process.  However, the degree to which bias was potentially introduced was not 
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measured in this study.  Ideally, a study that compares FASCAT outcomes 
between FASCAT assessments completed with DHS or NCFPD assistance 
versus FASCAT outcomes completed independently, would better measure the 
degree of facilitator bias.   
State Officials’ Risk Perception 
 There are multiple potential contamination risks to the food system (e.g., 
chemical, biological, radiological, and physical).  It is likely that SOs perceive 
food and agriculture risks based on their own first hand recall of food 
contamination events in their states.  SOs perceive that food and agriculture 
systems are not at risk from intentional chemical attacks, but are at high risk of 
biological attacks.  Of course there is no way to determine which intentional 
contamination event is the most probable without accurate intelligence of a 
pending attack, but chemical, radiological, and physical attack types are more 
likely to be successful since many food systems are not designed to mitigate 
these threats.  For example, some food companies actively test for biological 
agents and some food processes have kill-steps to prevent biological agents 
from persisting through the system.  In contrast, numerous chemical agents are 
heat and pressure stable so they will survive most kill-steps and are thus 
expensive and difficult for food companies to mitigate.   For these reasons, 
chemical, physical and radiological attacks on any food system are more likely to 
be successful, and thus are more probable.  SOs may have been biased by 
repeated exposure to the government and media’s bioterrorism messaging, DHS 
or NCFPD trainers’ preference for biological terrorism, or by some combination of 
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the two.   
 Regardless of where potential bias to risk-type originates, SOs are 
required to know and understand the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP).  Understanding the NIPP is important because it demonstrates familiarity 
with minimally acceptable risk management practices, the diversity of enemies 
that threaten critical infrastructures (including food and agriculture), and the many 
methods available to attack these systems.  SOs perceived that their risk 
assessment teams do not understand the NIPP to a high degree.  While having a 
high degree of understanding of the NIPP is not the best metric to measure risk 
management practices and knowledge, it is essential at the state government 
level to ensure that society is at least minimally protected by routinely engaging 
in security management best practices.  Future research should examine the 
breadth and depth of security knowledge in SOs and others who are responsible 
for managing critical infrastructure risks. 
State Officials’ Practices and Funding 
 Society relies upon valid forms of risk and criticality assessment to identify 
risks and to quantify the degree of risk reduction after the deployment of 
mitigation strategies or technologies.(26)   Fortunately, SOs are using risk and 
criticality assessments as part of their organizations’ security management 
strategies.  Despite SOs’ use of risk and criticality assessments to identify risky 
food systems, SOs perceive that they are not mitigating these risks and that they 
do not have adequate funding to mitigate the identified risks.  The amount of 
money state governments receive for food defense training and risk mitigation 
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has been a highly contentious issue during the past several years.  Despite the 
ongoing battle between states to obtain scarce security resources from the 
federal government, SOs perceive that they have not received adequate training 
or funds to improve the resiliency and security of food systems.  Future research 
should be conducted to determine the level of training SOs have received related 
to food defense, the level of funding that SOs receive to mitigate food defense 
risks, and why SOs are not receiving the funding necessary to mitigate serious 
risks to the food system. 
Limitations  
 This study had several limitations.  The response rate was low (39.5%).  
Self-reports were used to measure risk perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors 
instead of more objective measures of these concepts, and due to the high 
turnover rate of SOs, risk perceptions may change over time.  The FoodSHIELD 
database may have contained incorrect SO contact information, potentially 
limiting the distribution of surveys.  SOs missing from the FoodSHIELD database 
and not surveyed were probably more resource deprived compared to SOs who 
participated in the study. 
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CONCLUSION  
  Risk perception studies are important to determine actual risk and 
reasons for allocation of scare security resources.  One challenge is the potential 
for introduced biases in that assessment.  This study found that SOs felt that 
FASCAT was easier to use and more valued compared to other forms of risk 
assessment available to SOs.  Despite FASCAT usability and value, NCFPD and 
DHS trainers may have unintentionally introduced bias in assessment of 
probability, threat, vulnerability, and consequence during the FASCAT training 
sessions.  SOs inaccurately perceive that intentional biological threats to the food 
system are the most probable threat and tended to believe that state or federal 
governments do not adequately fund food defense risk mitigation at the state 
level.  Even if FASCAT trainers did unintentionally bias SOs, the magnitude of 
bias is difficult to quantify.  Future studies that examine the distribution of 
FASCAT scores by food system type and determine if SO type (e.g., 
veterinarians, administrators, security managers) and food system type are 
strongly related to FASCAT scores will help assess bias of different SOs.  
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Chapter Four:  Empirical Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture 
Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) and the Collected 
Data 
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To protect and secure food resources for the United States (U.S.) and prioritize 
funding for these protection efforts, it is crucial to have a method to compare food 
systems' criticality.  In 2007, the U.S. government funded development of the 
Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) to determine 
which food and agriculture systems were most critical to the nation as required 
by Homeland Security Presidential Directives 8 and 9.  FASCAT was developed 
in a collaborative process involving government officials and food industry 
subject matter experts (SMEs), collecting data and quantifying threats, 
vulnerabilities, consequences, second and third order consequences, and the 
impacts on the U.S. from failure of evaluated food and agriculture systems. In the 
past 4 years FASCAT has been used to evaluate the criticality of 804 disparate 
food commodity and product systems in the U.S.  With the aid of FASCAT, 
multiple state governments successfully nominated food and agriculture systems 
as Department of Homeland Security Critical Infrastructure or Key Resources 
(CIKR).  Despite the successful nomination of food and agriculture systems as 
CIKR, the FASCAT method has not been examined to determine its 
distinctiveness compared to the Department of Homeland Security risk 
assessment method, its utility for determining food and agriculture system 
criticality, or the validity of the questions used in FASCAT.  To examine 
FASCAT’s validity, linear regression models were used to determine (1) which 
groups of questions posed in FASCAT were better predictors of cumulative 
criticality scores; (2) whether the items included in FASCAT's criticality method or 
the smaller subset of FASCAT items included in DHS's risk analysis method 
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predicted similar criticality scores.  Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was used 
to determine which regression models best described criticality, and a mixed 
linear model was used to shrink estimates of criticality for individual food and 
agriculture systems.  The results indicated that (1) some of the questions used in 
FASCAT strongly predicted food or agriculture system criticality and many 
questions used in FASCAT did not strongly predict criticality; (2) the FASCAT 
criticality formula was a stronger predictor of criticality compared to the DHS risk 
formula; (3) the cumulative criticality formula predicted criticality more strongly 
than weighted criticality formula; and (4) the mixed linear regression model did 
not change the order of food and agriculture system criticality to a large degree.  
The FASCAT criticality method is a distinct method to determine food and 
agriculture systems criticality and many of the questions used in FASCAT are 
strongly predictive of criticality.  Despite the strong predictive nature of the 
questions used in FASCAT, the FASCAT algorithm can nonetheless be refined to 
increase its predictive power and utility as a security resource prioritization tool.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Identifying and evaluating critical food infrastructures and key resources is 
needed to allocate mitigation funds (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001).  
Multiple methods to evaluate critical infrastructure and key resource risks and 
criticality have been developed over the past decade, and these methods have 
been used to allocate scarce threat mitigation resources (Haimes, Kaplan, & 
Lambert, 2002).  The all hazards criticality assessment method relies upon 
identifying all plausible threats, the associated vulnerabilities, the probability of 
threat occurrence, and the consequences of the threats to the infrastructure.  
After the all hazards assessment method has been applied, risk managers can 
allocate threat mitigation resources to the most critical infrastructures or key 
resources.  Some criticality assessment methods rely on subjective qualitative 
assessments.  Other criticality assessment methods attempt to be more 
quantitative by using combinations of stochastic, deterministic, cost-benefit, 
consequence-based, or vulnerability risk analysis methods.  Regardless of the 
type of qualitative or quantitative or criticality assessment selected, all rely on 
assumptions that potentially undermine the validity of the assessment.  Despite 
the weaknesses of relying on assumptions in criticality assessment methods, 
these assumptions are necessary due to the lack of high quality data on many of 
the threats (e.g., terrorism). 
 One of the advantages of qualitative criticality assessments over 
quantitative methods is that they can be applied rapidly and efficiently to critical 
infrastructure systems (e.g., public health systems, financial systems, food and 
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agriculture systems).  One problem that the government and private industry 
have in applying risk or criticality assessment methods to large systems is the 
exorbitant number of individual facilities, processes, and sub-systems that need 
to be individually analyzed.  To conduct a risk or criticality assessment for an 
entire system requires an immense amount of data, and collecting these data 
requires time from government officials and private sector employees.  Often 
private sector companies are reluctant to share sensitive information with the 
government.  The amount of time, money, and resources required to perform 
quantitative risk or criticality assessments for all sub-systems and facilities is 
great and likely unrealistic.   In part, this is why the government has used 
qualitative criticality assessment to evaluate critical infrastructure systems in 
preference to quantitative assessments, despite its nherent subjectivity. 
 Homeland Security Presidential Directives 8 and 9 require that the 
government identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to critical infrastructures 
and determine which food and agriculture systems are most critical to the nation, 
but they do not specify a method for analyzing critical infrastructures (Bush, 
2003; Bush, 2004).  To accomplish this monumental task, the United States 
(U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mandated that all states identify 
and report critical infrastructures and key resources, including food and 
agriculture systems, to the Office of Infrastructure Protection.  Initially, states 
were required to identify their critical infrastructures to comply with HSPD-9.  The 
primary objective, as seen by the White House’s Homeland Security Council, 
was to help states ensure that they had collected the necessary data to access 
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DHS grants across all critical infrastructure sectors.  Previously, these grants 
primarily went to police, fire, medical, financial, and energy sectors, as they had 
been clearly defined as critical infrastructure and the need for additional 
resources was not difficult to articulate.  No grants went to the food and 
agriculture sector because criticality data was not collected.  This was mainly 
attributable to the lack of a standardized method to collect and compare food and 
agriculture systems’ data.  To help state and federal governments identify critical 
food and agriculture systems, the National Center for Food Protection and 
Defense (NCFPD) developed the Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality 
Assessment Tool (FASCAT) in 2007 (Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, 2013).  
In 2008, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan named FASCAT as a priority 
program for identification of critical food and agriculture systems (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010).  Although FASCAT was named as a priority program 
by DHS, several organizations within the federal government contested the use 
of FASCAT for determining criticality until they realized that the food and 
agriculture sector needed to be analyzed like other critical infrastructure systems 
(e.g., electric grid, financial system; Anonymous, personal communication, June 
13, 2012). 
 FASCAT is a structured interview and criticality scoring software program 
for analyzing food and agriculture systems.  To use FASCAT, government 
officials typically convened a group of relevant subject matter experts (SMEs) 
from private industry to review the food and agriculture system.  SMEs were used 
in the process because academic and government food and agriculture system 
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stakeholders (e.g., Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council) thought 
these SMEs could reasonably estimate food system vulnerabilities, potential 
threats to food systems, the consequences if food or agriculture systems were 
contaminated or destroyed, the magnitude of the impact on society that the 
consequences could have, and second and third order effects that would follow 
the systems' disruption.  The SMEs would deliberate and come to a consensus 
on each section of FASCAT.  The person responsible for each state's critical 
infrastructure assessments would record the answers in FASCAT.  After data 
input, a criticality score on an ordinal scale was calculated.  The higher the 
FASCAT’s score, the more critical the food or agriculture system under 
evaluation was deemed to be.  After criticality scores were generated for multiple 
systems in each state (37 states participated), state government officials would 
select the most critical systems as identified by FASCAT to be nominated to DHS 
as critical infrastructure or key resources.  Over the course of 8 years, state 
officials and SMEs evaluated 804 food and agriculture systems with the aid of 
FASCAT.   
 Despite FASCAT’s apparent transparency and relevance to food systems 
criticality (i.e., face validity) and broad use by state governments, the present 
study was concerned about the validity and ability of FASCAT to accurately 
measure food and agriculture system criticality (i.e., construct validity).  Initially, 
during government and industry food and agriculture meetings, many scientists 
asked DHS to operationally define criticality (Dunn, 2005; Wise & Nader, 2002).  
Critical infrastructures are the assets, systems, and networks, physical or virtual, 
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that are so vital to the U.S. that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health 
or safety, or any combination thereof (Critical Infrastructures Protection Act, 
2006).  Before FASCAT, criticality was not mathematically defined for systems, 
yet facility level criticality was used as the metric to determine which 
infrastructures are of the greatest importance to the U.S. and its people.  
FASCAT measures criticality using the formula: 
Crit = T + C + C23  + I + V + S + Co + P + A 
where Crit = criticality, T = threats, C = consequences, C23 = 2nd & 3rd order 
consequences, I = impact of event(s), V = vulnerabilities, S = scale of event, Co 
= concentration of event, P = probability of the selected events occurring, A = 
size of the geographic area affected, each of these items being evaluated on a 
numeric scale and then added together as in the formula.  It could be argued that 
FASCAT is nothing more than a DHS-defined risk assessment formula: 
R = T x V x C 
where R = risk, T = threats, V = vulnerabilities, C = consequences, which are 
multiplied as in the formula.  Potential values to the variables listed above are 
available in Appendix B.  Although there are obvious differences between the 
components of the risk and criticality formulas, the operational definitions of the 
individual components of FASCAT’s formula were more precisely defined than 
those of the traditional risk assessment formula.  The consequences in the 
criticality formula were clearly separated to indicate the magnitude, the scale, the 
second and third order consequences, and the duration of potential harmful 
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disruptions to the food or agriculture system.  With these additional and more 
precisely defined inputs, FASCAT’s criticality formula could potentially provide 
different and more valuable information than the risk assessment formula.  
 Regardless of whether qualitative risk or criticality assessments are 
actually a bifurcation of the same underlying construct (i.e., valuable and 
vulnerable systems), determining which food and agriculture systems are most 
critical to the nation gives people with an interest in risk and criticality 
assessment a general guideline on how to prioritize future assessments of 
specific food system types and thus allocate scarce resources (Ayyub, McGill, & 
Kaminskiy, 2007).  Other studies have persuasively argued that using rank 
ordering to allocate threat and vulnerability mitigation resources is not effective 
(Cox Jr., 2008; Cox Jr., 2009).  These studies have proposed alternative risk 
assessment methods that are more logically sound than the methods used in the 
DHS risk or FASCAT methods, but these proposed alternatives are not feasible 
or scalable for assessing the vast quantity of food and agriculture systems.  
Highly variable and broadly distributed food and agriculture systems require a 
quick and perhaps necessarily unsophisticated method for assigning risk or 
criticality; more complex risk analysis methods (e.g., hierarchical optimization, 
probabilistic models, decision tree models, game-theory models) would be 
extremely cost prohibitive (with existing technology) to apply to 2.1 million farms 
and 28,000 food production companies in the U.S. (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2007; U.S. Department of Commerce, 2008).  When assessing risk, 
there is a clear cost (e.g., speed, time, and money) trade-off between risk 
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assessments with high validity versus those with lower validity (Tetlock & Mellers, 
2011).  Some people have persuasively argued that terrorism risk assessments 
cannot be validated due to the asymmetric and non-stochastic nature of terrorism 
events (Vleck, 2013).  However, this argument leaves policy makers with no 
means of making resource allocation decisions.   
 The FASCAT data includes repeated assessments of 94 different food 
system types and 804 food systems.  These data represent the largest collection 
of systems-based qualitative risk assessments conducted in the U.S.  These data 
provide a unique way to evaluate FASCAT’s utility and areas for improvement in 
the collection of risk assessment data of food and agricultural systems.  
 Despite the potential strengths of the FASCAT formula and process, there 
appear to be problems with FASCAT’s software taxonomy, i.e., the way food and 
agriculture systems were defined.  To make the underlying constructs of the 
FASCAT assessment more specific and reliable, FASCAT’s developers provided 
operational definitions for key terms in the FASCAT software.  However, the 
definitions were at times overly complex, difficult to interpret, or not mutually 
exclusive.  Consequently, researchers observed that the overlap between food 
and agriculture systems in the FASCAT taxonomy made it unnecessarily difficult 
for analysts to determine what type of system was actually being evaluated (e.g., 
dairy product manufacturing, dairy product (except frozen) manufacturing, fluid 
milk manufacturing).  With the intent of collecting more specific and reliable data 
from food industry SMEs, FASCAT’s developers may in fact have made 
measurements of the underlying constructs (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities, 
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consequences) less specific and reliable by creating poorly worded operational 
definitions (i.e., the definitions of key terms that were provided to SMEs). 
 FASCAT is used by individual states to measure food and agriculture 
systems’ criticality in a manner that has several weaknesses (e.g., weak 
operational definitions, potentially biased data collection methods).  DHS requires 
that individual states report all critical infrastructures on a bi-annual basis.  
However, food and agriculture systems often span multiple states and indeed are 
often part of a global system, while few assessments have been conducted on 
even a regional, let alone national, scale.  Thus, different states often conduct 
repeated assessments on sections of the same food and agriculture system and 
then submit duplicate assessments of food and agriculture systems to DHS as 
part of the Data Call (a process that collects critical infrastructure and key 
resource data from states).  The most important implication of this is that food 
and agriculture systems that are broadly distributed could be overlooked because 
the amount of critical infrastructure present and measured within individual states 
could be deemed insufficient to gain the attention of state or federal government 
officials.  This is especially true if a state contains important elements of a system 
that are small within the state but critical for the overall larger system. 
 A wide variety of data types were collected in FASCAT (e.g., emergency 
contacts, state government agency, primary rater’s occupation, criticality, threats, 
consequences, 2nd & 3rd order consequences, impact of event(s), vulnerabilities, 
scale of event, concentration of event, probability of the selected events 
occurring, size of the geographic area affected).  Data were collected not only on 
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food and agriculture systems, but also on characteristics of the people who were 
responsible for leading FASCAT data collection sessions, collecting data 
required for FASCAT assessments, and submitting completed FASCAT reports 
to DHS.  Five different types of vocations were entered into FASCAT (security 
professionals, veterinarians, administrators, food defense managers, emergency 
managers) and these vocational data can be used to determine whether people 
holding different jobs tend to perceive criticality differently.  If differences between 
vocational rater types exist, then even highly manual data collection and criticality 
scoring processes like FASCAT’s may need to be adjusted to accurately assign 
criticality scores to infrastructures. An evaluation of these measurement, 
taxonomy, and data type weaknesses is central to improving U.S. criticality 
assessments methods.  
 This study seeks to address the complex measurement of food-system 
criticality by evaluating the existing FASCAT tool and the data collected by this 
tool.  The goals were fourfold namely to determine: whether the FASCAT method 
of criticality assessment is valid; if the FASCAT criticality assessment method is 
different from other traditional forms of risk assessment; which food systems are 
most critical to the nation; and, which method of criticality scoring is most 
effective. 
Specific objectives were: (1) describe food and agriculture system 
characteristics; (2) determine if raters with different occupations rated food and 
agriculture systems’ criticality differently; (3) determine the best predictors of 
criticality score by category type; (4) compare risk and criticality formulas and 
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compare cumulative and weighted scores; (5) identify significant predictors of 
criticality; and (6) determine which food and agriculture system types are most 
critical to the U.S. on average.  
Our study’s results will broadly inform food protection and defense policy 
by comparing food system criticality scores.  Additionally, this study will evaluate 
the FASCAT tool used to measure food systems’ criticality and suggest ways to 
improve this tool.  
 
METHOD 
 Data collected with FASCAT from 2010 to 2012 were analyzed using:  
descriptive statistics to characterize the food systems that primarily comprise the 
U.S. food supply chain and to determine how people with varying job types rated 
systems criticality; regression analyses to compare the DHS risk formula 
framework to FASCAT’s criticality formula; and regression analyses to determine 
which types of inputs (e.g., consequence, threats, impacts) contribute most to 
FASCAT’s criticality formula. 
 
Participants & Data 
 During the data collection process, a state would convene a group of 
SMEs (5 to 25 SMEs on average) to determine their state's food and agriculture 
systems’ criticality or in limited cases complete the FASCAT assessment without 
SMEs from the private sector (Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, 2013).  During 
the data collection process, SMEs and state officials would answer the questions 
provided in FASCAT and would provide open text field responses to further 
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clarify their responses, as necessary.  The data analyzed contained FASCAT 
assessments from 94 food and agriculture system types (see Figure V) 1  
collected by 37 different states from January 2008 to July 2012.  FASCAT 
generates cumulative and weighted criticality scores for each food and 
agriculture system. The cumulative score is the sum of all the responses and the 
weighted score weights the impact variables in FASCAT by 1.5 times for each 
impact variable selected.2  To protect the privacy of states’ criticality data, ID 
numbers were assigned to states in random order.  A third party vendor stored 
collected data. 
 
Procedure 
 To determine food and agriculture system criticality, SMEs from 37 states 
were asked to identify the threats, consequences, 2nd & 3rd order consequences, 
impacts of identified consequence(s), vulnerabilities, scale of events, 
concentration of events, probability of the selected events occurring, and the size 
of the geographic area affected, in that order.  In cooperation with DHS, State 
officials and the National Center for Food Protection and Defense collected the 
data analyzed in this study from 2008 to 2012.  The scores assigned to each of 
the possible responses are provided in Appendix B (Tables B1 through B6).  
                                                
1 Figure V contains an inclusive list of the food and agriculture system types evaluated by states.  Food and 
agriculture1system types were obtained from the North American Classification System (NIACS) and 
not all of the food system types available in the NIACS were analyzed by SMEs. 
 
2 The cumulative criticality formula is Crit = T + C + C23  + I + V + S + Co + P + A and the weighted 
criticality formula is Crit = T + C + C23  +( I x 1.5) + V + S + Co + P + A. 
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After the data were collected, missing records (77 instances) were removed 
because FASCAT cannot generate a criticality score from an incomplete 
assessment.   
 For objective 1, descriptive statistics were computed with SPSS 19 (SPSS 
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). For objectives 2-5, ANOVA and regression analyses 
were performed with R version 2.13.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 
Vienna, Austria).   
Occupations were categorized into six independent groups (i.e., 
administrator, emergency manager, food defense manager, security 
professional, unknown, and veterinarian).  ANOVA was used to compare the 
differences in criticality assessment by rater type (objective 2). 
 Controlling for raters’ indicated job-type, location, and food or agriculture 
system type, linear regression models and ANOVAs were used to determine 
which groups of questions posed in FASCAT were better predictors of cumulative 
criticality scores and whether the items included in FASCAT's criticality method, 
or the smaller subset of FASCAT items included in DHS's risk analysis method, 
predicted similar criticality scores (objective 3).   
 For objective 4, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was used to 
determine which regression models best-described criticality.  Many of the food 
and agriculture system types evaluated had few ratings by SMEs (i.e., small 
sample sizes), so a mixed linear model was used to shrink estimates of criticality 
for individual food and agriculture system types to develop a better description of 
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the food and agriculture system types that the data indicate are most critical (a 
detailed explanation is provided in Appendix C).  
 To assess significant predictors of criticality (objective 5) we fit a multiple 
linear regression with cases (observations) being ratings of individual systems (n 
= 731), outcome (dependent variable) being FASCAT cumulative score, and one 
binary (yes/no) predictor for each of the possible threats.  The analysis 
estimated, for each threat type, the average difference between cumulative 
scores when that threat was present versus when it was absent, adjusting for all 
other threat types, and provides a test of whether that average difference can be 
distinguished from unexplained variation in the cumulative scores.  State, rater 
type, and system type were also controlled for.  
 Finally, a linear model was fit controlling for state and rater type to 
determine which food system types are the most critical to the U.S. (objective 6). 
In the FASCAT data, some food and agriculture system types had erroneous 
entries.  Food system types with small sample sizes with extreme values were 
incorrectly identified as being highly critical.  For example, in one case where the 
system was based upon vegetable production, loss of herd or flock was selected 
as a consequence (artificially inflating the criticality score) and this is not 
physically possible.  To correct for the system types with small sample sizes and 
extreme values, a linear mixed effects model, fit by restricted maximum 
likelihood, with a random effect for food and agriculture system type (94 groups) 
was used to shrink systems with small sample sizes and extreme criticality 
scores; for an individual system type, the estimated cumulative score from this 
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analysis will be shrunk from its average toward the values implied by its predictor 
values, in this case state and rater type (a detailed explanation is provided in 
Appendix C).    
 
RESULTS 
Objective 1: Food System Characteristics  
 The weighted FASCAT scores, by food and agriculture system type (n = 
731), had a median of 110, a standard deviation of 37.06, and a range of 15 to 
184.  The cumulative FASCAT scores, by food and agriculture system type (n = 
727), had a median of 87, a standard deviation of 22.17, and a range of 15 to 
123.  The difference between weighted FASCAT scores and cumulative scores is 
due to the weighting of the impacts of a food defense event.  The overall 
distribution of weighted scores was left skewed and unimodally distributed and 
the cumulative scores were more symmetrically distributed but with some left 
skewing (Figures I & II).  In states that performed multiple assessments, scores 
were mostly symmetrically distributed (Figure III). 
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Figure I. Distribution of FASCAT cumulative scores. 
 
 
Figure II. Distribution of FASCAT weighted scores. 
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Figure III.  Distribution of criticality scores by state. 
 
Objective 2: Differences in Scores by Rater Type 
 Food defense managers rated food system criticality lower on average 
than all other groups, while emergency managers and administrators tended to 
rate food systems as having higher criticality compared to the other groups.  
ANOVA was also calculated on weighted scores and the findings were similar to 
the cumulative scores (Figure IV).  ANOVA indicated that SMEs' ratings of food 
and agriculture systems (cumulative scoring) significantly differed by job type, F 
(5, 721) = 16.20, p < .001.   
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Figure IV. Distribution of cumulative criticality scores by job-type. 
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Objective 3: Best Predictors of Criticality Scores by Group Type  
 Threats, consequences, 2nd and 3rd order effects, and impacts are 
supposed to be considered by SMEs in their ratings of criticality.  We analyzed 
FASCAT cumulative scores to see which specific threats, consequences, 2nd 
and 3rd order effects, and impacts are in fact associated with these scores.  For 
the analysis of threats, a multiple linear regression was performed with cases 
(observations) being ratings of individual systems (n = 731), outcome (dependent 
variable) being FASCAT cumulative score, and one binary (yes/no) predictor for 
each of the possible threats.  The analysis estimated, for each threat type, the 
average difference between cumulative scores when that threat was present 
versus when it was absent, adjusting for all other threat types, and provides a 
test of whether that average difference can be distinguished from unexplained 
variation in the cumulative scores (i.e., noise).  State, rater type, and system type 
were controlled for.  Analogous analyses of consequences, 2nd and 3rd order 
effects, and impacts were performed.  A Tukey's post-hoc test was used to adjust 
the significance tests to control the chance of false-positive findings.   
 Tables VI, VII, VIII, and IX illustrate results for threats, consequences, 2nd 
and 3rd order effects, and impacts, respectively.  For example, in Table VI, 
chemicals, drought, loss of operation rights, loss of access, misinformation, 
radiological contamination, food pathogens (vegetable), food pathogens (non-
vegetable), and foreign animal diseases were associated with higher criticality 
scores.  Interestingly, intentional adulteration of food and agriculture products 
was not identified as significant contributors to food and agriculture criticality 
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scores.  These mixed results indicate that the way threats to food and agriculture 
systems are evaluated in FASCAT should be altered, or that state officials and 
food industry subject matter experts might not be reliable and valid predictors of 
threats to the food and agriculture systems.  Specifically, naturally occurring and 
anthropogenic threats should be considered independently of each other. 
 
Table VI: Association of threats in FASCAT with the cumulative score, in 
the order that they were presented to the SMEs. 
Item Mean 
Squares 
F p value p-value from  
Tukey’s HSD 
1.   Animal rights activists 517 2.77 .096 .142 
2.   Chemical/toxin 11,412 61.23 < .001* < .001* 
3.   Destruction 1,403 7.52 .006* .064 
4.   Drought 2,346 12.58 < .001*     .006* 
5.   Exotic plant pest or disease 1,246 6.68 .009*  .081 
6.   Loss of operation rights 5,294 28.41 < .001* < .001* 
7.   Loss of access 3,604 19.33 < .001*    .001* 
8.   Misinformation 3,731 20.02 < .001*    .010* 
9.   Radiological contamination 5,425 29.10 < .001* < .001* 
10. Cyber attack 162 .870 .351 .408 
11. Food pathogens vegetable 3,084 16.54 < .001*    .002* 
12. Intentional adulteration 1,352 7.25 .007* .134 
13. Food pathogen non-vegetable 3,503 18.79 < .001*    .007* 
14. Native plant disease or pest 1,318 7.07 .008* .189 
15. Production disruption 264 1.41 .234 .446 
16. Plant pests 146 .783 .376 .693 
17. Theft 364 1.95 .162 .302 
18. Foreign animal disease 5,408 29.01 < .001* . < .001* 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
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 In Table VII, short-term system shut down, reduced output, product 
shortage, mass casualty, and contamination of herd or flock were significantly 
associated with higher criticality scores.  Contrary to the majority of speculative 
and subjective literature related to the major consequences of food 
contamination events, loss of capital, loss of access to customers, economic 
loss, loss of access to credit, and cost of response were not strongly associated 
with food and agriculture system criticality scores.  Similar to FASCAT’s threats, 
these mixed results indicate that the way threats to food and agriculture systems 
are evaluated in FASCAT should be altered, or that state officials and food 
industry subject matter experts might not be reliable and valid predictors of 
threats to the food and agriculture systems.  For example, reduced output and 
loss of key output are essentially the same consequence; therefore, there is a 
reasonable expectation that their p values should be similar and they are not.  
Contrary to popular belief, the economic loss questions in FASCAT are not 
associated with food and agriculture system criticality.  This indicates that 
economic loss criticality metrics do not provide any additional information on food 
and agriculture systems criticality; therefore, the collection of this type of 
information is likely unnecessary to correctly rank-order food and agriculture 
systems. 
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Table VII: Association of consequences in FASCAT with the cumulative 
score, in the order that they were presented to the SMEs. 
Item Mean 
Squares  
F p value p-value from Tukey’s 
HSD 
1.   Short-term system shut down 1,051 5.34 < .001* < .001* 
2.   Reduced output 10,337 52.52 < .001* < .001* 
3.   Product shortage 2,986 15.17 .001*    .012* 
4.   Mass casualty 9,043 45.95 < .001* < .001* 
5.   Loss or contamination of herd or flock 4,440 22.56 < .001* < .001* 
6.   Loss of tourism  1,374 6.97 .008* .051 
7.   Loss of labor 636 3.23 .072 .203 
8.   Loss of seed source 186 .945 .331 .453 
9.   Loss of key output 147 .747 .387 .600 
10. Loss of key input 661 3.35 .067 .222 
11. Loss of capital 2,003 10.18 .001* .096 
12. Loss of access to customers 368 1.87 .171 .426 
13. Economic loss 658 3.34 .067 .364 
14. Loss of access to credit 1,966 9.98 .001* .055 
15. Cost of response 621 3.15 .076 .427 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level  
  
 
 In Table VIII, damage to the government’s tax base, damage to 
customers, disease spread to others, loss of access to insurance, and loss of 
public confidence were associated with food and agriculture system criticality.  
Loss of market access, government cost to respond, hazardous waste disposal, 
and the cost of litigation were not associated with food and agriculture system 
criticality scores.  Similar to the consequence questions, questions related to 
economic losses were not associated with food and agriculture criticality scores.  
Therefore, the inclusion of economic metrics in food and agriculture systems 
criticality has limited value in differentiating food and agriculture systems from 
each other.  
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Table VIII: Association of 2nd and 3rd order effects in FASCAT with the 
cumulative score, in the order that they were presented to the SMEs. 
Item Mean 
Squares  
F p value p-value from 
Tukey’s HSD 
1. Loss of public confidence 12,324 59.15 < .001*  < .001* 
2. Loss of market access 1,331 6.38 .011* .119 
3. Loss of access to insurance 10,388 49.86 < .001*  < .001* 
4. Government cost to respond 850 4.07 .043* .264 
5. Disease spread to others 4,923 23.64 < .001*     .001* 
6. Hazardous waste disposal 14 .068 .794 .814 
7. Damage to government’s tax base 2,608 12.52 < .001*     .026* 
8. Damage to customers 4,744 22.77 < .001* < .001* 
9. Cost of litigation 51 .245 .620 .667 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level  
 
 In Table IX, several factors were predictive of criticality: the loss of supply, 
loss of sub-system, limited to 1 state, 10,000 human casualties, more than 5 
states impacted, and more than 1 year to recover were associated with food and 
agriculture systems criticality scores.  Not surprisingly, less than 5 states 
impacted and less than 1 year to recover were not associated food and 
agriculture systems criticality scores as they do not mathematically contribute as 
much to criticality scores.  The questions asked in the impact section seem to 
best differentiate food and agriculture system criticality. 
 
Table IX: Association of impact items in FASCAT with the cumulative 
score, in the order that they were presented to the SMEs. 
Item Mean 
Squares  
F p value p-value from  
Tukey’s HSD 
1. Loss of supply 11,077 50.68 < .001* < .001* 
2. Loss of sub-system 3,223 14.75 < .001* .007* 
3. Limited to 1 state (geographic extent) 1,805 8.26 .004* .020* 
4. 10,000 human casualties 4,666 21.35 < .001* .003* 
5. More than 5 states (geographic extent) 6,110 27.95 < .001* < .001* 
6. Less than 5 states (geographic extent) 266 1.21 .270 .402 
7. Less than 1 year to recover 264 1.20 .271 .411 
8. More than 1 year to recover 3,836 17.55 < .001* .023* 
* Indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level  
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Objective 4: Comparison Between Risk and Criticality Formulas 
 Scientists, managers, and policy experts from government, academia, and 
industry have argued that criticality analyses lack construct validity because risk 
and criticality analyses are measuring the same underlying construct.  To 
determine whether including FASCAT's additional items for criticality, beyond 
those included in the DHS risk formula, did in fact contribute to FASCAT's 
cumulative and weighted scores, risk and criticality formulas were compared to 
determine if these formulas had different outcomes under cumulative and 
weighted scoring.  To compare risk and criticality in this way, a multiple linear 
regression for each formula type (risk and criticality) within each scoring type 
(cumulative and weighted) was performed controlling for location, rater type, and 
system type (Tables X and XI; see methods).  For both weighted and cumulative 
scoring types, the items in FASCAT's criticality formula (R2 = .825 and R2 = .836, 
respectively) were better predictors of FASCAT scores compared to the items in 
the DHS risk formula (R2 = .763 and R2 = .780, respectively).  Also, DHS risk and 
FASCAT criticality items predicted cumulative criticality scores (R2 = .780 and R2 
= .836, respectively) better than weighted scores (R2 = .763 and R2 = .825, 
respectively).  Using Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC; smaller scores are better 
and AIC levies a penalty for each additional predictor in the criticality formula) 
gave results similar to R2 (AIC for DHS risk items = 6,697.40 and 5,690.30 for 
weighted and cumulative scores respectively; AIC for criticality items = 6,317.06 
and 5,529.35 respectively).  
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 These results indicate that the additional predictors in the criticality 
formula do in fact differentiate criticality from risk (Table X and XI).  The adjusted 
R2  from the regressions performed in Tables X and XI, indicates that the 
questions asked in FASCAT explain more of the variance in criticality scoring 
compared to the DHS risk formula, and that the cumulative scores explain more 
of the variance in criticality scoring compared to weighted scoring.  This 
regression analysis indicates that the cumulative scoring method is the most 
representative of criticality in food and agriculture systems, and it is also 
supported by the visual inspection of the data discussed below. 
 In Table XIII, a few examples are provided to demonstrate how cumulative 
and weighted scoring methods affect food and agriculture system criticality 
ranking.  An excellent example of where weighted scoring underperforms is the 
comparison between a poultry farm (cumulative score 105, weighted score 158) 
and a poultry processor (cumulative score 105, weighted score 157.5).  The food 
defense risk is in fact higher at the processor due to the types of vulnerabilities 
and it is closer in proximity to the consumer in the supply chain.  The differences 
in food and agriculture criticality scoring methods (outcomes), and the effect it 
has on food and agriculture systems criticality ranking, are discussed later (see 
discussion section). 
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Table X: Comparison of regression models based upon weighted scoring. 
Model Type df for error R2 Adjusted R2 AIC 
Risk a 510 .763 .671 6,697.40 
Criticality b 485 .825 .746 6,317.06 
a Risk:         Analysis including risk items only (i.e., items describing threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences) 
b Criticality:  Analysis including items in the Risk model and also items describing probability and 
impacts 
 
 
 
 Table XI: Comparison of regression models based upon cumulative 
scoring. 
Model Type df for error R2 Adjusted R2 AIC 
Risk a 510 .780 .695 5,690.30 
Criticality b 485 .836 .762 5,529.35 
a Risk:         Analysis including risk items only (i.e., items describing threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences) 
b Criticality:  Analysis including items in the Risk model and also items describing probability and 
impacts 
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Table XII: Selected examples where weighted scoring alters the food and 
agriculture criticality ranking (partial list). 
Cumulative 
Score 
Weighted 
Score System Type 
105 158 Poultry Farm 
105 157.5 Poultry Processing 
105 157 Apple Farm 
103 155 Vegetable and Melon Farm (Except Potato) 
103 154.5 Dairy Cattle Farm 
103 154.5 Dairy Cattle Farm 
103 154 Brewery 
101 152 Swine Farm Finishing 
101 151.5 Poultry Farm 
101 151.5 Poultry Processing  
101 151 Beef Farm/Ranch 
99 149 Poultry Farm 
99 148.5 Dairy Processing  
99 148 Government Laboratory  
97 146 Dairy Processing  
97 146 Vegetable and Melon Farm  
97 145.5 Dairy Processing  
97 145 Dairy Processing 
93 140 Poultry Farm 
93 140 Poultry Processing  
117 140 Grain Warehouse 
93 139.5 Dairy Processing  
115 138 Frozen Food Processing 
115 138 Swine Farrow Operations 
91 137 Fruit Farm 
91 137 Grain Processing 
91 136.5 Grain Processing 
91 136.5 Grain Processing 
91 136 Beef Processing 
 
 
  
  82 
Objective 5: Significant Predictors of Criticality 
 To determine which questions (predictors) could be eliminated from 
FASCAT's criticality formula and data collection process and to make the 
evaluation process more efficient, FASCAT cumulative scores were analyzed to 
see which specific threats, consequences, 2nd and 3rd order effects, and 
impacts contributed significantly to the criticality scores.  Sixteen questions in 
FASCAT significantly contributed to criticality scores (P < 0.05 without 
adjustment for multiple comparisons; Table XIII).  These results imply that many 
of the questions in FASCAT could be removed since only the questions in Table 
XII differentiate food and agriculture systems relatively strongly.  In a future 
study, item response theory can be used to definitively determine which 
questions, if any, can be removed from FASCAT. 
 
Table XIII: Significant contributors to cumulative criticality scoring, in the 
order that they were presented to the SMEs. 
* indicates that the p value is significant at the .05 level 
  
Item Estimated effect SE  p value 
1.  Ease of Attack - High 23.20 6.26 < .001* 
2.  Ease of Attack - Medium 25.58 6.58 < .001* 
3.  Scale – Mid -size -30.87 15.60 .048* 
4.  Threat – Chemical/toxin -29.28 6.14 < .001* 
5.  Threat – Loss of operation rights 4.16 1.75 .018* 
6.  Threat – Radiological contamination 3.32 1.45 .022* 
7.  Threat – Food pathogen vegetable 7.07 1.98 < .001* 
8.  Threat – Pathogen contamination 4.08 1.60 .011* 
9.  Threat – Theft 3.69 1.39 .008* 
10. Consequence – Mass casualty 4.70 1.37 < .001* 
11. Consequence – Loss of heard or flock 4.08 1.59 .011* 
12. Consequence – Loss of labor -26.04 5.66 < .001* 
13. Consequence – Loss of capital 6.35 2.32 .006* 
14. 2nd & 3rd Order effect – Disease spread to others 4.42 1.46 .002* 
15. 2nd & 3rd Order effect – Damage to customer base -6.05 2.34 .010* 
16. Impact – More than a year to recover 4.35 1.86 .020* 
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Objective 6: Food and Agriculture Systems’ Criticality 
 Scientists, managers, and policy experts from government, academia, and 
industry often argue about which food system types are most critical in the U.S. 
without any objective analyses to inform their opinions.  The mixed linear model 
did not shrink the estimates of individual system types to a large degree, 
indicating that their average cumulative scores did not differ from the values 
predicted by state and rater type (Figure V). 
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Figure V. Box plot cumulative criticality scores by commodity type 
arranged from high to low. 
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DISCUSSION  
 This study is concerned with whether the FASCAT method of criticality 
assessment is valid.  Validation in the truest sense would require a comparison 
of FASCAT outcomes to a gold standard or to a series of actual negative events 
in food and agriculture systems.  So in fact there is no validated criticality 
analysis standard to compare FASCAT to.  The second objective was to 
determine if the FASCAT criticality assessment method is different from other 
traditional forms of risk assessment and the analyses indicate that they are in 
fact different.  The analyses indicated that FASCAT is able to determine which 
food systems are the most critical to the nation in rank order, but that the 
number, type, and quality of the questions in FASCAT can be improved.  Lastly, 
the analyses performed indicate that the criticality scoring method is more 
predictive than the DHS risk method in determining criticality; however, the 
underlying information collected in each assessment method is different and thus 
this finding is not incredibly surprising.  
 The FASCAT data does have some limitations; incorrect data could have 
been entered into FASCAT.  Some state officials may have unintentionally 
selected threats or consequences that could not possibly apply to the system 
being analyzed (e.g., foreign animal disease as a threat to apple production).  
Also, some states might try to game FASCAT to artificially increase the criticality 
scores of some food and agriculture systems in hope of receiving federal grant 
dollars to mitigate risks.  On the other hand, some states could have intentionally 
not indicated threats or consequences hoping that their state would escape 
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increased federal regulatory oversight or administrative burden.  Fortunately, 
statistical methods can help identify some of these anomalies.  Regardless of the 
sources of bias and error in the FASCAT data, better data and methods exist for 
answering some of the questions posed by FASCAT to SMEs (Brady et al., 
2012).  
 One weakness in the data collected by FASCAT is that many people did 
not provide their job type and were classified as having an unknown job type.  
Also, some individual food and agriculture system types had relatively few 
assessments (e.g., spice processing).  Further, there were some potentially 
erroneous responses to the questions posed in FASCAT.  Even though these 
potential problems with FASCAT were identified, FASCAT appears to do certain 
things well. 
 Our analysis found that the distribution of cumulative criticality scores 
approximated the normal distribution more closely than weighted criticality scores 
(Figures I & II).  Currently, the data entered into FASCAT is not heavily 
scrutinized and the weighted FASCAT score is used without question when 
nominating food and agriculture systems as critical infrastructures.  If the 
cumulative score is used to determine criticality, rather than the weighted score, 
then simple procedures for identifying statistical outliers could alert an analyst to 
carefully examine the data entered (looking for potentially erroneous data entries) 
to more objectively identify the most critical food and agriculture systems.  When 
the distributions of scores were examined from individual states the cumulative 
criticality scores resembled the normal distribution (Figure III).  Several 
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observations suggest that the weighting in the weighted criticality-scoring 
algorithm increases the criticality score of food and agriculture systems in an 
arbitrary manner, apparently because of SMEs selecting impacts (and thus 
weights) differently for similar systems.  For example, two different but similar 
milk systems were evaluated by SMEs.  For one system, they indicated that 
there could be at least 10,000 human casualties, while for the other they 
indicated that there would not be at least 10,000 human casualties.  However, 
data provided in the descriptive open text fields indicated that if either system 
were attacked there could be over 10,000 casualties in both systems.  Instances 
like this illustrate how weighting criticality scores can increase the amount of bias 
and error present and can lead to the suboptimal appropriation of scarce risk 
mitigation resources.   
Even though critical food and agriculture systems can be identified with 
standard outlier detection methods, some data suggest that there are some 
problems with FASCAT's data collection.  Most notably, people with different 
types of occupations tend to respond to the questions differently (objective 2).  If 
FASCAT assessments were used to determine which food and agriculture 
systems were most critical to the nation, then some of the differences in criticality 
scores could be attributed to the risk perceptions of the rater in each state, rather 
than actual differences in food system criticality. 
 Despite the weaknesses in the FASCAT data collection method, enabling 
states to gather and collect data about food and agriculture systems helps state 
and industry partners determine where they are potentially vulnerable, helps 
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states become more knowledgeable about their food and agriculture systems, 
and provides a forum for government and private sector food and agriculture 
system stakeholders to engage and work together to improve food and 
agriculture system security (Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, 2013).  
Collecting food and agriculture systems criticality data via the distributed user 
method enables efficient collection of highly variable food and agriculture 
systems data, and the uniform and structured data collection process helps 
reduce biases and noise in the collection of survey data, despite the bias which is 
potentially introduced by the group consensus method of collecting data (Huff, 
Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, In Press).  FASCAT’s results make fundamentally 
different food and agriculture systems comparable in terms of criticality and then 
rank orders systems by their criticality score.  Some risk experts have opined that 
rank ordering risks and criticality is not a valid method (Cox Jr., 2008; Cox Jr., 
2009; Lakoff & Klinenberg, 2010; Stewart, Ellingwood, & Mueller, 2011).  
However, besides saving in time and effort that it allows, the FASCAT method 
also may aid people that have limited understanding of risk or criticality analysis 
in the tough process of allocating scarce threat mitigation resources at federal 
and state levels. 
 In a previous and related study, Huff et al. (2013) observed that each 
FASCAT assessment takes roughly an hour to complete on average (Huff, 
Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, 2013).  In this study, the goal was to identify which 
questions were the strongest predictors of criticality, to make the FASCAT data 
collection more time efficient (Objective 5).  Currently, FASCAT requires SMEs to 
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deliberate about and answer 50 questions.  Of the 50 questions analyzed, only 
16 were significantly associated with cumulative criticality scores (Table XIII).  In 
the design of future criticality analysis methods, it may be more effective to have 
SMEs only respond to questions that clearly contribute to cumulative criticality 
scores, such as those in Table VII.  
  Interestingly, some items that national security experts strongly believe to 
be directly proportional to criticality in food and agriculture systems did not test 
significant in this analysis, e.g., Scale – Mid size and Threat – Chemical (Shea, 
2011).  This is not to say that chemical threats or mid-sized systems are not 
critical, rather that the population of SME opinions analyzed here tended to not 
rate chemical threats as a risk to critical food and agriculture systems.  A strong 
argument can be made that chemicals are in fact potentially a high threat due to 
their persistence in food and agriculture products, their lack of or masked taste3, 
and their potential for high mortality and morbidity.  If a correction to criticality 
scoring for this apparent problem could be justified, then one way to correct this 
problem would be to educate SMEs on the risks posed by chemicals and have 
them rescore chemical threats for all systems (although this would be highly 
impractical).  In contrast, one overarching risk that SMEs reported is the potential 
for radiologic and infectious agents to be used as a weapon, and these agents 
have been identified as high risk in previous research and government reports 
(Table I, Table VII) (Cleland, Lindner, Rakestraw, & Resnick, 2011).   
                                                
3 Many chemicals have flavor; however, their taste is masked by the food product since many chemicals 
taste salty, sweet, or like spices. 
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 The analysis indicated that throughout the various sections in FASCAT, 
SMEs were concerned with enteric pathogens in all food types, endemic and 
exotic zoonoses, and anthroponoses (Table I, II, III, & VII).  For good reason, 
SMEs should be concerned about these types of anthropogenic and naturally 
occurring hazards disrupting food and agriculture systems, as they have caused 
billions of dollars in damage to the world’s economy, caused the unnecessary 
deaths of millions of animals, and caused much human suffering (Newell et al., 
2010; Scallan et al., 2011).  In conclusion, there is tremendous heterogeneity in 
criticality scoring, which arises from SMEs’ perceptions of threats, 
consequences, 2nd & 3rd order consequences, impact of event(s), vulnerabilities, 
scale of event(s), concentration of event, probability of the selected events 
occurring, and the size of the geographic area affected.  It is likely that the 
heterogeneity of cumulative criticality scoring makes the food and agriculture 
systems with small sample sizes appear to be more critical than they actually 
are. 
 To correct for the small sample sizes for some food and agriculture 
system types, a linear mixed effects model was used to shrink estimates for 
individual food and agriculture system types, even though as it turned out the 
mixed effects model did not shrink the estimates for individual food and 
agriculture system types to a large extent.  This suggests that the analysis 
indicated which food and agriculture system types were the most critical in a way 
that is not at the mercy of extreme averages occurring for systems with small 
sample sizes (Figure V).  Interestingly, individual food and agriculture system 
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types with many repeated measurements appear to have normally distributed 
criticality residuals (e.g., poultry farms).  Although the linear mixed effects model 
corrects for small sample sizes across food and agriculture system types, some 
food system types appear to be highly critical when they are commonly thought 
to be not highly critical in terms of potential public health consequences (e.g., 
apple farms, sugarcane farms, and seafood warehouses).  While these particular 
examples are probably not high-risk and high-consequence food and agriculture 
system types in terms of public health, they are highly critical in terms of regional 
economics.  The high criticality of these systems is probably due to the high 
geographic density of these systems’ facilities and the geographic distribution of 
the food and agriculture products that are derived from them.  In contrast, the 
model indicated some food and agriculture systems types that are in fact 
potentially high-risk to human health were highly critical (e.g., retail processing 
operations, other non-refrigerated domestic processed foods), which further adds 
to the face validity of the criticality scoring method used in FASCAT. 
 FASCAT provided an initial attempt to measure and compare the complex 
and disparate food and agriculture systems.  Despite the apparent face validity of 
criticality as measured by FASCAT, the results from FASCAT’s criticality scoring 
method and data collection process can be improved.  Specifically, the analysis 
of criticality scoring by job-type indicates that people with different job-types 
respond to the same questions differently.  To address this problem, state 
officials with similar job-types could be identified to use the FASCAT in each 
state; however, this recommendation is not practical.  The analyses also 
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indicated that many of the questions asked in FASCAT do not significantly 
contribute to criticality scoring.  Further, the cumulative scoring method 
statistically outperforms the weighted scoring method, and visual inspection of 
the data verifies that the weighted criticality ranking of food and agriculture 
systems is altered in manner that artificially inflates criticality.  For example, in 
Table XII a government laboratory has a cumulative criticality score of 99 and a 
weighted criticality score of 148.  It is difficult to imagine any single government 
laboratory that could single handedly cause over 10,000 human casualties 
impact more than 5 states, have a loss of supply, and lose the sub-system. 
 Despite the need to measure criticality and risk more objectively in 
national security paradigms, the reliance upon SMEs to measure criticality was 
an acceptable approach, given current political and economic constraints, to 
identifying critical food and agriculture systems with limited time and money 
(Huff, Kircher, Hoffman, & Kennedy, 2013).  However, instead of asking SMEs to 
decide about the probability and consequences of events that have been well 
studied (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, drought, floods), risk analysts and the 
government should use one of the many existing models to objectively and 
precisely measure the probability of naturally occurring threats to food and 
agriculture systems and incorporate the results of those types of analyses into 
criticality scoring (Aven & Renn, 2009; Parnell, Smith, & Moxley, 2010).  
Generally, SMEs’ opinions can be flawed, and their opinions should be replaced 
with objective data when it exists (e.g., hurricanes model data, earthquakes 
model data).  Therefore, SMEs’ informed subjective judgment should only be 
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used when objective data does not exist, when their judgment can be applied to 
a central problem (e.g., terrorist attacks, of which there are relatively few), and 
when their judgments can be broadly applied to many systems.   
 In summary, if the government chooses to continue measuring food and 
agriculture systems criticality in a way similar to the method used in FASCAT, 
then the number of questions asked in FASCAT should be reduced by only 
asking questions that significantly contribute to cumulative criticality scoring.  
Also, the FASCAT criticality analysis method does not specifically take into 
account any risk mitigation strategies that have been deployed within the food 
and agriculture systems being evaluated; the software does not contain 
questions that remind the SMEs to consider the possible effects of risk mitigation 
activities.  Therefore, inevitably some food and agriculture systems have been 
inadvertently misclassified by the SMEs when responding to the FASCAT, and 
data collected in the open text fields related to kill-steps and other risk mitigating 
activities supports this conclusion.  Another area for improvement is that SMEs 
should not be estimating the likelihood of terrorism threat types (e.g., chemical, 
radiological, biological) unless they have actual intelligence or other information 
to suggest that these types of threats are in fact likely and plausible in the food 
and agriculture system selected.  Only a handful of the threats in FASCAT 
significantly contribute to criticality scoring (Tables VI and XII). Therefore, these 
threat related questions do not help FASCAT differentiate between food and 
agriculture systems.  As previously stated, there are many instances in the data 
were threats where selected by SMEs and state officials that were not plausible 
  94 
based upon the system being evaluated.  These issues could be resolved by 
removing these types of questions from FASCAT altogether and not asking 
SMEs to estimate the likely types threats and agents used in an attack on the 
food or agriculture system being evaluated.  
 If FASCAT in its current form is continued, then more comprehensive and 
structured training should be provided to SMEs and state officials by a neutral 
third party (which may help prevent erroneous or implausible responses to 
questions in FASCAT), and the operational definitions provided in FASCAT 
should be revised to be more consistent and concise.  Instead of having SMEs 
focus on attack agent types and threats (since they do not help differentiate food 
and agriculture systems from each other), having SMEs determine the amount of 
contaminated servings per batch could be a better measure of the criticality of 
the system related to human health and would be a better use of their time.  This 
metric could then be used to estimate the number of contaminated servings 
distributed by the food and agriculture system type.  Many states mentioned in 
the open text fields that the systems they analyzed spanned multiple states.  
Also, the data collected by FASCAT could be more reliable if SMEs and states 
routinely evaluated food and agriculture systems across state boundaries instead 
of within each state's jurisdiction, since many food and agriculture systems span 
multiple states.  When previous analyses of FASCAT are considered with this 
analysis, states should have a software platform that allows them to work on 
criticality assessments in cooperation with each other and does not require SMEs 
and state officials to travel to conduct assessments with each other.  
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 One potential limitation of the present study is that determining validity of 
SME ratings of food and agriculture systems is impossible without a standard to 
which direct comparisons can be made.  Also, it is possible that some of the 
criticality data evaluated in this study were measured repeatedly and over-
represented in individual states, thus potentially biasing the results of this study.  
Further, the data collection process used in FASCAT enables FASCAT trainers 
to potentially influence the pooled responses of SMEs and state officials.  
Additionally, people with different job classifications (occupations), which is 
closely related to many individual psychological constructs, perceive and report 
criticality differently from each other.  However, half of the people that performed 
FASCAT assessments did not provide their job-type, and were thus lumped 
together as having job type "Unknown."  Another problem was that some 
individual food and agriculture system types had only a few assessments (e.g., 
spice processing).  Also, some potentially erroneous responses to the questions 
posed in FASCAT were found.  Even though these potential problems with 
FASCAT were identified, FASCAT appears to perform more or less as it should. 
 The use of FASCAT requires time and money from private corporations, 
and state and local governments to collect the necessary data.  It would be 
advantageous to develop a new method of criticality assessment that is more 
objective.  In the future, a software program that collects the necessary criticality 
data in a distributed manner, directly from state officials and from the food 
facilities that comprise the food and agriculture systems, would greatly improve 
data accuracy and collection efficiency.  If a spatial network model were 
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constructed of each food and agriculture system evaluated, then it is possible to 
more objectively determine risks to food and agriculture systems.  If these spatial 
food systems network data were then combined with spatial risk layer data (i.e. 
geographic overlays containing risk data), it may be possible to more objectively 
measure the threats, their probabilities of occurrence, and the likely impacts that 
these negative events could have on food and agriculture systems.  This would 
eliminate the need for subjective and potentially biased SME and state official 
input in criticality data collection.  This proposed data collection and analysis 
method has challenges.  First, food and agriculture companies and state 
governments would have to spend non-trivial amounts of money to adopt this 
type of new type of data collection technology.  Also, the organization that holds 
the spatial food systems network data would have to be highly protected and 
access to these data would have to be tightly controlled. Whether new and more 
objective methods of criticality analysis are developed in the future, FASCAT's 
criticality assessment method has greatly assisted state and federal governments 
in attempting to measure a complex problem and the present study's results can 
help future risk and criticality methodologists develop algorithms and methods 
that are better at predicting criticality or risk to keep the nation’s food system 
safe. 
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Chapter Five:  The Development of a Novel Method for the 
Spatial Analysis of Criticality 
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In the context of National Security, multiple methods to quantify risk and criticality 
have been developed and deployed over the past 14 years to protect the nation’s 
most vital infrastructures and systems.  These methods included a wide variety of 
forms (e.g., qualitative and quantitative) and were targeted at various levels and 
types of critical infrastructures (e.g., individual facilities, sub-systems, and 
systems).  One consistent problem is that these methods relied upon subjective 
and likely biased inputs from subject matter experts (e.g., data estimates; 
generalized supply chain structure; perceived threats, probabilities, and 
consequences).  To address these problems, there is a need for novel data 
collection that has the potential to eliminate the subjectivity and bias in data 
collection currently used in risk and criticality assessments.  Specifically, this 
novel method employs a user-generated, spatially explicit software platform for 
data collection and criticality assessment.  This method does not require any 
subjective estimation of supply chain structure or of disruptive events (e.g., 
hurricanes, floods, etc.) from subject matter experts, thus reducing bias 
introduced by subjective opinion. 
 
  
  99 
INTRODUCTION 
 Criticality assessments have been used in multiple academic and 
professional disciplines to identify which complex systems components are 
essential to system functionality (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002; 
Erdmann & Graedel, 2011).  More recently, criticality assessments have been 
used to identify critical processes or assets, sub-systems, and systems in the 
United States’ (U.S.) portfolio of national infrastructure to mitigate any associated 
risks (e.g., food and agriculture systems, water systems, chemical supply chains, 
public health systems, transportation, energy systems).  During criticality 
assessments, analysts use qualitative and quantitative methods to systematically 
evaluate multiple aspects of complex systems (Kaplan & Duchon, 1988; 
Niehaves & Stahl, 2006).  Over the past several years, these methods have been 
used to filter through a tremendous amount of critical infrastructure data to 
prioritize risk mitigation resources to make these infrastructures more resilient to 
failure (Katina & Hester, 2013).  When criticality assessments are used with risk 
analysis and risk management, then the end result is the successful application 
of risk mitigation resources, which in turn creates more resilient complex 
systems.   
 Criticality assessments methods are fraught with problems, particularly 
with data collection procedures and standard definitions.  Even operational 
definitions of criticality are vague, inconsistent across groups, and difficult to 
implement.  Even if operational definitions are precise, then who or what 
organization decides what is critical?   It is extremely difficult to clearly define the 
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boundaries and the relationships of the system in which the asset or sub-system 
is embedded.  For example, a highway may have more importance to a multi-
state region than to a county or small state’s economic activity. Therefore, a 
federal organization may prioritize this infrastructure differently than a state or 
county organization.  Also, collecting the necessary data can be extremely 
difficult, expensive, and time consuming as the individual assets are often 
privately owned and these private owners are often reluctant to collect or share 
the necessary and relevant information with government agencies.  Even when 
the necessary data are easily accessible from open sources, the data can be 
difficult to integrate efficiently (e.g., spatial data can be in different projections 
and reference systems, thus making the merging of spatial data time 
consuming).  The operational definition of assets is also ambiguous.  For 
example, a milk processing facility, a bulk milk tank, and a milk transportation 
vehicle can all be considered assets and determining the appropriate level of 
aggregation is unclear.   
 Due to inconsistencies in data collection and management, criticality 
assessment methods and criticality metrics have been contentious issues in the 
Federal government and academic community (Bristow, Fang, & Hipel, 2012).  In 
the government, this has been predominantly due to the overuse of quantitative 
methods that used terminology and operational definitions that were highly 
subjective and inconsistent.  When scientifically based solutions have been 
offered by independent scientists to determine criticality, government officials 
have not been receptive to the solution, as they wanted the ability to 
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independently assign criticality without relying on scientific methods (Anonymous 
Senior DHS official, personal communication, 2012).  For some people in federal 
government agencies, determining criticality may mean quantifying criticality in a 
way that matches their predefined political agenda of threats, vulnerability, and 
consequence, and then potentially dismiss objective and scientific analysis.  This 
highlights the political reality and difficulty in attempting to objectively quantify 
criticality in an objective way.  Despite some federal government agencies’ 
inability to accept empirically based solutions for the determination of criticality, 
the federal government has been receptive to the development of new methods 
to objectively and empirically quantify criticality.  
 Criticality assessments are useful despite the weaknesses in criticality 
assessment methods.  Although criticality assessments are not well defined or 
highly structured, they are comprehensive in their ability to holistically evaluate 
assets, sub-systems, and systems.  They help systematically establish and 
define the causal relationships in a supply chain or complex system (e.g., causes 
and effects of failure in a system during a disruption) over multiple disruption 
types (e.g., cyber attacks, physical disruption, natural disasters).  Importantly, 
criticality analysis is most useful for identifying individual critical points and the 
most likely types of disruptions in sub-systems and systems. 
 Criticality analysis takes many shapes depending on the audience, the 
operational definitions constructed for key terminology, and the nature of the data 
available for analysis.  Currently, most criticality analysis relies on subjective 
information collected from industry and government subject matter experts, 
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government databases, and other forms of open source data.  Many of the 
sources of information and data used in criticality assessments are subjective, 
biased, or have unknown validity.  Also, these assessments are unable to neatly 
define the geographic extent of the area being examined, the extent of the 
systems network, and the assets that make up sub-systems and systems.  While 
many of the existing criticality assessment methods are technically scalable, the 
ability to rapidly and precisely adjust the scale of the assessment, from a single 
sub-system to multiple sub-systems, does not exist. 
FASCAT DEFICIENCIES 
The previous chapters identified many weaknesses of one criticality-
assessment tool, the Food and Agriculture Systems Criticality Assessment Tool 
(FASCAT).  These weaknesses are caused by the FASCAT training process, the 
FASCAT data collection process, and by problems in FASCAT itself.  To properly 
use FASCAT, state officials and subject matter experts received training from the 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) trainers.  The training sessions required several hours 
of time on the part of all state officials and subject matter experts, who actually 
provided the data collected by FASCAT.  This is problematic because other 
currently available methods (the other currently available methods for calculating 
criticality are discussed later in this chapter) are better suited to more quickly 
measure food and agriculture system criticality.  Additionally, the monetary cost 
of sending subject matter experts and FASCAT trainers to training sites is 
thousands of dollars (e.g., transportation, lodging, meals, lost wages, and facility 
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fees) and there are less costly currently available methods to calculate criticality 
that do not require convening state officials and subject matter experts (the other 
methods for calculating criticality are discussed later in this chapter).  Lastly, 
training state officials and subject matter experts must occur on a regular basis 
because these employees change positions within their organizations and 
become unfamiliar with FASCAT without continual use because DHS only 
collects critical infrastructure data on a biannual basis.  
 Sometimes food and agriculture systems criticality data were collected 
during FASCAT training sessions as a means to reduce the costs associated 
with performing additional data collection sessions with state officials and subject 
matter experts.  However, when training and data collection cannot be combined 
the costs associated with data collection are exorbitant.  In some cases, this 
resulted in state officials using FASCAT without subject matter experts.  This is 
problematic because state officials often do not fully understand the food and 
agriculture systems within their states and thus may have entered inaccurate 
data into FASCAT.  Subsequently, whether critical or not, these FASCAT data 
may have been used within states to justify the nomination of a food and 
agriculture system or facility for consideration as United States’ critical 
infrastructure or key resources.  States that used FASCAT may have incorrectly 
rank-ordered their own infrastructures.  Then, these states may have submitted 
nominations of these incorrectly rank-ordered food and agriculture infrastructures 
to DHS.  Therefore, DHS could have potentially allocated significant resources to 
infrastructures that were not critical.  
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The costs and problems associated with FASCAT data collection were 
compounded by the biases introduced by FASCAT trainers, state officials, and 
subject matter experts.  FASCAT trainers often influenced or potentially biased 
state officials or subject matter experts responses to the questions posed in 
FASCAT.  When training sessions and data collection occurred simultaneously, 
FASCAT trainers were either asked or gave strong suggestions about how state 
officials and subject matter experts should respond to the questions posed in 
FASCAT.  Also, state officials and subject matter experts were sometimes 
inclined to protect their special interests and would intentionally provide 
inaccurate subjective answers to either decrease or increase FASCAT’s criticality 
score (Personal observation, Andrew Huff, 2012).  This could have resulted in 
biased estimates of the food and agriculture systems being evaluated.  It is 
possible to game FASCAT by manipulating the subjective responses to 
questions, which is problematic for DHS.  DHS had the difficult task of identifying 
biased or highly subjective critical infrastructure or key resources state 
nominations (nominations that may have relied upon underlying FASCAT 
assessments in as many as 37 states) and comparing them to other unbiased (in 
theory) state nominations for allocation of security mitigation resources.  This 
could bring FASCAT’s reliability into question at DHS and to other government 
stakeholders (Food and Agriculture SCC/GCC Spring Quarterly Meeting, DHS, 
2012).       
In addition to biases introduced by FASCAT users, FASCAT was not 
systematically used across the United States.  This was due to the large 
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geographic extent of some food and agriculture systems, the unwillingness of 
some states to use FASCAT, and lack of necessary resources and expertise 
(whether real or perceived) to conduct the assessments.  In some instances, it is 
possible that multiple states used FASCAT to evaluate the criticality of the same 
food and agriculture systems, since many food and agriculture systems are 
national in scale.  This could have resulted in DHS receiving multiple criticality 
assessments for the same food and agriculture system from multiple states.  
Also, the lack of systematic use of FASCAT created large gaps in criticality data 
about food and agriculture systems that DHS had available for assigning risk 
mitigation resources in states that did not use FASCAT.   
 FASCAT itself had many limitations.  First, the operational definitions in 
FASCAT are poorly worded and are confusing to users.  This could result in 
unsystematic error in state officials’ and subject matter experts’ responses 
depending on how the group interpreted the meanings of these imprecise 
definitions, thus altering the food and agriculture systems’ criticality scores in 
FASCAT.  Another problem inherent to FASCAT is its use of ordinal scaling in 
criticality scores.  Not knowing the measurable and practical difference between 
adjacent criticality scores (i.e., the difference between a criticality score of 100 
and 101) makes justifying risk mitigation resources difficult for DHS.  Moreover, 
FASCAT requires state officials and subject matter experts to speculate on the 
probabilities, frequencies, and consequences of natural disasters and negative 
anthropogenic events, which food and agriculture subject matter experts often 
cannot accurately assess.  Lastly, FASCAT is costly to maintain. 
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MITIGATING CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT DEFICIENCIES  
Data Collection and Linking Spatial Data 
 Because of the many deficiencies identified in FASCAT, a new method to 
determine criticality in food and agriculture systems was sought.  The new 
criticality assessment goals were to increase objectivity, efficiency, and 
accuracy.  One of the first deficiencies identified was the amount of time required 
to train state officials and subject matter experts on the use of FASCAT.  To 
decrease the amount of time required to train multiple state officials and subject 
matter experts, a web-based criticality assessment method, which did not rely on 
state officials or subject matter expertise for data collection, was chosen for 
development.  Instead of collecting food and agriculture systems criticality data 
from state officials and subject matter experts in a group setting, state officials 
and subject matter experts can each independently access a web-based graphic 
user interface to provide data on their portion of the food and agriculture 
system.  The data each user provides have a series of attributes (Table 
XIV).  Since most people providing the data necessary to determine food and 
agriculture system criticality only know a small portion of the system (e.g., who 
their company procures products from and who their company sells their 
products to), the underlying criticality assessment software links the system 
together based upon the spatial attributes of each facility in the food and 
agriculture system (Table XIV).  Thus, the food and agriculture systems structure 
data (i.e., supply chain data) that is necessary to determine food and agriculture 
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system criticality is collected from individual users at their convenience and is 
linked together by the software, thus saving time.   
This new data collection method resolves several limitations identified in 
FASCAT.  First, this new data collection method decreases the amount of 
training time and data collection cost for DHS, state governments, and private 
industry since training and data collection meetings are not needed.  Also, as 
state officials and subject matter experts move into other positions within their 
organizations, or leave their organizations altogether, there is no need to spend 
time and money retraining users on criticality assessment methods like FASCAT 
since this new criticality assessment method relies on the food and agriculture 
systems’ spatial attributes.  In FASCAT, state officials and subject matter experts 
had to work together to figure out how the food and agriculture systems’ products 
flowed through the system.  In this new method, state officials and subject matter 
experts do not need to know how the whole supply chain works: they only need 
to provide their system’s structure data, thus greatly reducing the burden to state 
governments and to private industry. 
Improvements to Biased, Subjective, and Incorrect Criticality Scoring 
 Three of the primary concerns identified in the preceding analysis of 
FASCAT were that it was possible for FASCAT users to provide biased, 
subjective, or incorrect criticality data to FASCAT.  These concerns were further 
exacerbated by the fact that the operational definitions to key terms provided by 
FASCAT were confusing to FASCAT’s users, which likely contributed to the 
amount of error present in the FASCAT criticality data.  To improve upon these 
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identified weaknesses in FASCAT, this new criticality assessment method relies 
on spatial risk layers (see Criticality Scoring Method) to estimate the probability, 
frequency, and severity of natural disasters.  Instead of asking state officials and 
subject matter experts to deliberate and estimate the likelihood and magnitude of 
consequences of natural disasters (about which these people are not experts), 
the new method derives the criticality score from the summation of the risk layers 
(see Criticality Scoring Method).  Ideally, the spatial risk layers that are selected 
for criticality assessment contain empirically based, quantitative, and predictive 
risk estimates and probabilities (e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration flood risk layers). By using spatial data and risk estimates to 
calculate food and agriculture system criticality can thus greatly reduce or 
eliminate the amount of biased, subjective, or incorrect data used in the 
determination of criticality.  Compared to FASCAT, this new method has the 
added benefit of increasing the reliability of criticality scoring.  In FASCAT, the 
food and agriculture criticality assessments had different raters (i.e., state 
officials and subject matter experts) for each state and for each food and 
agriculture system type.  In the new criticality assessment method, criticality for 
all states and for all food and agriculture system types is calculated from the 
same underlying spatial risk data.  Therefore, the new criticality assessment 
method produces more objective, reliable, and comparable food and agriculture 
systems criticality assessment results. 
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Multi-state Criticality Assessments  
 One of the problems identified in FASCAT was that it was difficult for 
states to conduct food and agriculture criticality assessments across multiple 
states, and that multiple states likely evaluated the same food and agriculture 
systems multiple times.  The new criticality assessment method resolves these 
issues since state officials and subject matter experts only need to submit the 
data on the infrastructures they control, and are not asked to evaluate an entire 
food and agriculture system (even if the system spans multiple states).  Since 
this new criticality assessment method links these spatially related facilities and 
systems together without considering administrative boundaries (i.e., state 
boundaries), system criticality can be determined across state lines and 
nationally.  Potentially, with enough private industry and foreign cooperation, 
criticality scores could be calculated internationally since this new method can 
calculate criticality regardless of administrative boundaries.  The ability to 
perform criticality assessments across state and national boundaries, without 
requiring the travel of multiple state officials and subject matter experts is a 
significant advancement over FASCAT.  Since some states have chosen to not 
use FASCAT (for reasons that are unknown), enabling state officials and private 
industry to submit their data electronically may eliminate these gaps in data 
collection. 
Critical Interdependencies and Anthropogenic Events 
FASCAT was not able to evaluate food and agriculture systems critical 
interdependencies (e.g., electricity, water, and waste disposal).  Critical 
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interdependencies are systems that other critical infrastructures rely upon to 
operate.  Since this new method of criticality assessment uses entity relationship 
database architecture (Figure VII), this new method of criticality assessment can 
evaluate the relationships between critical food and agriculture systems and their 
critical interdependencies (e.g., the spatial relationship of a water node or 
electricity node in the network).  This ability gives the users a new capability to 
analyze critical interdependencies, without requiring the users to conduct an 
entirely different assessment on critical interdependencies, and is a capability 
that was not present in FASCAT. 
 For the first version of this criticality assessment method, earthquake risk, 
flood risk, hurricane risk, landslide risk, and volcano risk layers were used.  
However, future versions of the criticality assessment method can easily use 
other types of spatial risk layers (e.g., tornado, economically motivated 
adulteration, infectious disease, critical interdependency, cyber threat, and threat 
intelligence risk layers).  When intelligence agencies, private industry analysts, or 
academic analysts detect locations (whether domestic or foreign) that are 
engaging in nefarious activities, this information can be converted to a shapefile 
and loaded as a spatial risk layer into the new criticality analysis method.  This 
type of information can dramatically help the government and private industry 
decide where to invest scarce risk mitigation resources. 
 Based upon the identified gaps in criticality assessment methods, the goal 
of this project was to develop a criticality analysis method that: 1) reduces the 
subjectivity in the assessment process; 2) is spatially explicit; 3) is rapidly and 
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precisely scalable to different network topologies; and, 4) is quickly and precisely 
scalable to different geographic areas.  In the following sections the overall 
design, concepts, and details of the criticality analysis method is discussed.  
 
MODEL PURPOSE 
 Current criticality analysis methods are subject to user bias and subjective 
opinion.  Therefore, an objective and novel criticality analysis method is needed 
to reduce bias in criticality scores.  A novel criticality analysis model was 
developed to provide objective more objective criticality scores compared to the 
existing survey based criticality assessment methods.  The specific purpose of 
this criticality analysis method is to: 1) enable users to easily build and design a 
fully customizable network model which completely and accurately represents a 
complex product supply chain without relying upon any generalizations or 
assumptions; 2) determine which facilities are critical to the functioning of the 
supply chain; 3) identify which facilities may require risk mitigation based upon 
spatial risk; and, 4) enable an analyst to make comparisons of overall criticality 
between independent supply chains.  
 
ENTITIES, PROCESSING, & SCALING 
Entities & Scaling 
 Entities and their attributes in the model have specific characteristics 
(Table XIV).  Similar to actual supply chains, each entity in the supply chain can 
have one-to-many, or many-to-one relationships.  The spatial extent of these 
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relationships is flexible and is based solely on the spatial extent of each entity in 
the model, and is used only for model visualization.  For example, if the user 
defines two entities from neighboring zip codes, then the spatial model is 
automatically scaled to fit the extent of the two entities in the model.  Similarly, if 
the entities had geolocations on different continents, then the model would 
automatically scale the extent of the model to a global-scale when projected for 
visualization.  As the user constructs the model, the data is automatically saved.  
The users can store different versions of the model as necessary. 
Spatial Risk Layers for Risk Scoring 
 To determine risk scores for individual entities, global spatial risk layers 
were loaded into the model.  Specifically, global spatial risk data were obtained 
from the Center for Hazards and Risk Research (Dilley, 2005) for model 
development and testing purposes (i.e., hurricane, flooding, earthquake, 
volcanic).  These ASCII datasets use 2.5 by 2.5 minute raster, with values 
ranging from 1 to 10.  The higher the ranking in each raster cell, the greater the 
relative frequency compared to other raster cells.  When an individual entity is 
selected, the risk score from the selected spatial risk layer is retrieved and 
displayed.  When users select multiple entities, the model displays the sum of all 
selected entities’ risk values.  If the user selects multiple entities and multiple risk 
layers, then the sum of all risks and entities is calculated and displayed. 
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Critical Entity Identification 
 To identify and rank order the criticality of entities in a supply chain, or 
complex system, the model uses an algorithm developed by Arulselvan, 
Commander, Elefteriadou , & Pardalos (2009) to detect critical entities.  This is a 
heuristic-based method that can efficiently identify critical entities in a supply 
chain and rank orders them based upon their connectivity.  This method has 
been used across disciplines and has been tested and validated (Shen, Nguyen, 
Xuan, & Thai, 2012). 
 
 
Table XIV. Entity attributes 
Entity Attributes Value Required 
(Yes/No) 
Notes 
Zip code Integer Yes  
Address Integer No if entered, the address is 
georeferenced and the zip 
code is populated 
Coordinates Float No if entered, the coordinates are 
georeferenced and the zip 
code is populated 
Object Name/Type Integer Yes  
Owner/Point of 
Contact 
String Yes  
Product Name/Type String Yes  
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DESIGN CONCEPTS 
Basic Principles 
 The goal of this model is to streamline complex systems’ data collection 
and decision analysis for non-modelers.  The basic principle of the model and 
analysis is derived from systems dynamics and is well founded in systems theory 
(Forrester, 1994; Karnopp, Rosenberg, & Perelson, 1976).  However, in systems 
dynamics, assumptions must be made to simplify the complexity of the system 
and cope with the paucity of data.  In many types of models, these assumptions 
are often invalid and yield results that are not generalizable or useful in the real 
world (Carson, 2002).  To deal with this problem, this model has the users collect 
and populate the actual supply chain structure.  If the user only knows part of the 
systems’ structure, then systems’ structure is inferred and populated based upon 
geolocation (discussed later in this text).  Since the structure is a complete 
representation of the actual world, no assumptions of network topology are 
required.  The mechanics of the model building software are illustrated in Figure 
VI. 
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Figure VI.  Process and mechanics of the criticality software. 
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Linking Networks 
 In many supply chains, the user likely knows whom he is buying from or 
selling to.  This is problematic since any single user is not able to entirely 
populate the complete network model.  To address this obvious problem, the 
data entered by individual users is stored in a central database.  When a user 
creates new entities in the model, the software detects whether there are existing 
entities (stored in the database) that are spatially proximate.  When these entities 
are detected as being spatially related, the software prompts the user building 
the new model to verify that they supply chains are in fact related.  When the 
software indicates that multiple models are potentially related, the user is able to 
select the related supply chains from a drop down menu.  By spatially linking 
networks, the models will be more complete and representative.  
  117 
Data 
 Large food and agriculture companies, as part of their routine operations, 
create and maintain data describing routine business transactions that consists 
of: (1) where products, ingredients, or process aids are obtained; (2) between 
their own facilities; and, (3) where their products are shipped to.  The data held 
by these companies describes the relationship between nodes (e.g., facilities) 
and the volumes of product flowing between the nodes over time.  Data that are 
necessary for the models are: the name of the product moving through the 
system, the locations of the entities that are in the system, and the relationships 
of the entities in the model (direction of product movement).  The data are 
entered into the previously described graphic user interface and the users can 
opt-in or opt-out to share the data contained in their model with other users.  If 
the user opts-in to sharing then the data stored is available for other users to 
access and relate to their model(s), and data are stored in a secure cloud based 
server.   The data are stored and retrieved according to the entity-relationship in 
diagram (Figure VII). 
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Figure VII.  Entity-relationship diagram of the modeling software 
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Prediction 
 This software makes predictions on the frequency or impact of naturally 
occurring hazards to supply chains based upon the previously described spatial 
hazard data.  By relating data from independently owned facilities, the user is 
able to identify which individual facilities, sub-systems, and supply chains are at 
higher risk of disruption upstream or downstream of their portion of the supply 
chain.  Users of this software can see potential weaknesses in the system and 
are able to collaborate with business partners to make their supply chains more 
resilient to identified hazards. 
Criticality Scoring 
 This software calculates the criticality of a user’s facility, sub-system, or 
system.  Criticality of a user’s facility is calculated as: Crit  =    Σ  E,  F,  H,  L,  V  
where Crit = criticality, E = earthquake risk, F = flood risk, H = hurricane risk, L = 
landslide risk, V = volcano risk.  Criticality of a user’s sub-system or system is 
calculated: Crit  =   (𝐸𝑛,𝐹𝑛,𝐻𝑛,𝐿𝑛,𝑉𝑛)  𝑛  𝐿𝑜𝑐   
where Crit = criticality, Loc = location defined by the graticule from the Google 
Mercator projection, E = earthquake risk, F = flood risk, H = hurricane risk, L = 
landslide risk, V = volcano risk. 
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End Use 
 In reality, many supply chains are highly complex and taking the time to 
evaluate hundreds of individual facilities in a user’s supply chain is costly 
(money, time and required training of personnel).  By looking at the criticality 
score for each supply chain, users are able to quickly compare and identify which 
supply chains have more critical entities and risk.  Then, the user can collaborate 
with suppliers and buyers to make modifications to the number of suppliers (in 
situations where there are few critical suppliers), invest in engineering solutions 
to make facilities more resilient to hazards, and make informed decisions about 
business relationships.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 This criticality assessment method is an advancement over existing 
qualitative criticality assessment methods since this novel method is able to 
determine criticality based upon actual system structure and without the use of 
subjective and biased survey data.  Criticality must be derived from the sum of 
the systems’ actual parts and be precisely defined to objectively measure the 
criticality of a system.  Criticality cannot be objectively, scientifically, or 
empirically determined without knowing the entirety of a system’s structure and 
the structure of the systems they are being compared against.  The method and 
software described in this text lays out a path to measure criticality in an additive, 
objective, and empirical manner.  By measuring criticality in an additive, 
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objective, and empirical manner, then an analyst can objectively compare the 
criticality of facilities, sub-systems, or systems against each other. 
 This data collection and criticality analysis method has many potential 
uses and is potentially very powerful.  This software can be used by logistics 
personnel to spatially identify where products originate and where they are 
distributed; enabling them to determine more efficient warehouse locations and 
choke points in the supply chain.  People responsible for enterprise risk 
management can use this software to identify which supply chains and facilities 
are at risk and critical to the functioning of their business.  Risk managers will be 
able to mitigate risk through collaboration with newly identified upstream 
business partners and engineering solutions. This software could have value to 
supply chains where traceability is concern (e.g., food supply chains).  For 
example, if the companies in a food supply chain had to rapidly identify where 
contaminated food or ingredients moved, then the user could query the database 
to determine where contaminated products were sourced and allow for trace 
forward movement.  Regardless of the type of supply chain, there are many 
potential uses for this type of analysis and software (e.g., system dynamic 
modeling, simulation, trace-forward and trace-back investigations, spatial 
network analysis). 
 Despite the many potentially beneficial uses of the software, some 
companies may be hesitant to use software that shares their proprietary 
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information and supply chain structure with third parties.  This may be due to the 
perceived competitive advantage of their supply chain structure or the perception 
that their supply chain data could be used in a nefarious manner (e.g., a criminal 
uses the information to steal from or coerce a company).  Companies that want 
to use the software but do not want to share their information are able to opt-out 
of sharing data.  The ability for the user to opt-out of information sharing is 
necessary for many different types of potential users. Although the ability to opt-
out is important for many users, this could result in incomplete supply chains. 
Future model development should address ways to anonymize entity attributes to 
allow for complete supply-chains in cases where users opt-out.  Potentially, this 
could be accomplished by using access and identity management software, or by 
using a reference table with database rules, or a combination of both.    
 Storing different users’ related supply chain structure data in one location 
has some risks.  If the database is compromised many companies could lose 
their competitive advantage due to the unmasking of exclusive business 
relationships.  Furthermore, stolen information can be used by nefarious people 
(i.e., terrorists) to exploit the identified vulnerabilities in the supply chains.  
However, with the proper information protection measures (e.g., encryption, 
multi-factor authentication, access and identity management) the probability of 
successful information thefts can be greatly reduced (Olden, 2002; Subashini & 
Kavitha, 2011).   
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CONCLUSION 
 Over the years multiple methods to quantify risk and criticality have been 
developed and deployed to identify critical infrastructures and systems.  These 
methods were qualitative and quantitative, and one consistent problem was that 
these methods relied upon subjective and likely biased inputs from subject matter 
experts.  To address these problems, a novel method and software for data 
collection that can potentially eliminate the subjectivity and bias in data collection 
was developed.  Specifically, the novel method employs a user-generated, 
spatially explicit software platform for data collection and criticality assessment 
that can be broadly applied to multiple types of supply chains. Model output can 
be used to prioritize resource allocation, and aid in decision-making and 
investigations.   
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Chapter Six: Summary of Dissertation 
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Motivating Research Question 
 Food and agriculture systems are vital to the economic livelihood and to 
the public’s health in the U.S.  Simply, society cannot survive without nutritious, 
safe, and reliable food sources.  For these reasons, food and agriculture systems 
are, and will continue to be, targets for attacks by deranged individuals, terrorist 
organizations, and foreign militaries.  These enemies’ goals can be accomplished 
by disrupting the food and agriculture system through physical attacks on food 
and agriculture system infrastructures or by using the food system as a delivery 
mechanism for radioactive, biological, and chemical agents. Food and agriculture 
systems are often terrorist targets and can be efficient delivery mechanisms for a 
wide variety of attack agents.  Determining which food and agriculture facilities, 
sub-systems, and systems are at risk is necessary to protect the public and to 
allocate scarce food defense resources.  While identifying critical food and 
agriculture systems is necessary, determining criticality is a continuous, difficult, 
and resource consuming process.  To maximize efficiency, it is important to know 
what biases are present from those who collect food and agriculture systems 
data, which criticality assessment methods work the best, and to identify how 
criticality assessment methods can be improved. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Food Defense  
 The attacks on September 11, 2001 reignited the United States’ concern 
of bioterrorism attacks.  One of the primary bioterrorism concerns was that the 
U.S. food supply could be attacked.  This concern is well justified since there is a 
long and well-documented history of intentional contamination events on food 
and water systems  
 Prior to World War I, the Assyrians poisoned their enemies with 
mycotoxins in rye, the Athenian’s contaminated their enemies water with the herb 
purgative hellebore, the Spanish military gave wine tainted with blood infected 
with Leprosy, and during the American Civil War Confederate forces deliberately 
contaminated the Union’s water supplies by placing dead animals in their ponds.  
From World War I to World War II, much technological advancement occurred in 
biological and chemical warfare and several covert biological attacks occurred 
during this timeframe.   
From World War II to the end of the Cold War, several interesting and high 
profile food defense incidents occurred.  In an act of revenge Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki 
contaminated sponge cakes and other foods with Shigella dysenteriae and 
Salmonella typhimurium, two teenagers who were days away from contaminating 
Chicago’s municipal water supply with Salmonella typhimurium were arrested, 
Arfinn Nesset poisoned and killed at least 22 patients with the muscle relaxer 
Curacit, and in a trial run attack the Rajneeshees repeatedly and deliberately 
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contaminated numerous local salad bars, restaurants, and grocery store produce 
with Salmonella typhimurium resulting in the 1984 epidemic. 
 From 1991 to current day, there were several significant bioterrorism 
events, and further technological advancement in bioterrorism attacks.  First, the 
Patriots Council manufactured ricin and the solvent dimethyl sulfoxide in a plan to 
murder federal and local law enforcement agents.  Later, the terrorist 
organization Aum Shinrikyo performed a well-coordinated attack using the nerve 
gas sarin on the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 and injuring 5000 people.  In 
1996, a large and under reported attack on the food system occurred where 
chlordane (an organochlorine pesticide) had been used to contaminate liquid 
animal fats produced at a Wisconsin factory resulting in 4 million dollars in 
damages to industry. 
 All of these attacks demonstrated that the risks to food and agriculture 
systems are real and are significant.  With an infinite amount of potential targets, 
agents, and terrorist motivations, the history of bioterrorism indicates that the 
enemy has the advantage, and this tremendous advantage will persist into the 
future.  Thus, policy makers and risk managers tend to want to identify all of the 
potential targets, threats, weapons, and bad actors.  This is why policy makers 
and risk managers tend to focus on the consequences of bioterrorist attacks and 
focusing on bioterrorism consequences enables these people to make difficult 
resource allocation decisions to mitigate bioterrorism risks.  
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Chapter 2: The Development and Use of the Food and Agriculture Systems 
Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) 
 After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S. government 
established a policy to identify critical infrastructure, including food and 
agriculture production systems, to protect them from terrorist attacks.  In this 
chapter, the method of how identifying critical food and agriculture systems was 
discussed.  Identifying which food systems were the most critical to the nation is 
an enormous task since the food and agriculture sector is almost entirely 
privately owned, is comprised of an estimated 2.1 million farms, has over 1 
million production facilities, and accounts for roughly one-fifth of U.S. economic 
activity.  To assist the Department of Homeland Security in determining which 
food systems were the most critical to the nation, the National Center for Food 
Protection and Defense developed FASCAT to support states’ identification of 
critical systems.  The FASCAT documented, evaluated, and compared 731 
disparate complex food and agriculture systems across 39 states to determine 
their criticality.  The objective of these FASCAT assessments was to prioritize the 
allocation of threat mitigation resources to the most critical systems.  Before 
FASCAT, no food and agriculture systems were identified as critical in the U.S.  
Now with the use of FASCAT, many food and agriculture systems have been 
added to the criticality list.  
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Chapter 3: State Officials’ Perceptions of the Food and Agriculture Sector 
Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT), Food-system Risk, and 
Food Defense Funding 
Determining food system criticality is necessary to mitigate risks to the 
nation’s food supply and prioritize and allocate funding.  FASCAT is a tool used 
broadly by state governments to determine the criticality of food and agriculture 
systems throughout the U.S.  State officials (SOs) responsible for food defense 
(n = 32) were surveyed to determine whether FASCAT is of value to food 
defense and to determine SOs’ security beliefs, values, and practices related to 
food defense.  The results of this chapter indicated that: (1) SOs believe 
FASCAT is easier to use than other forms of risk assessment; (2) FASCAT 
training may have introduced bias into assessment of probability, threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences; (3) FASCAT is valuable to SOs; (4) SOs do not 
routinely follow security management best practices; (5) SOs believe that 
intentional biological threats to the food system are the most probable threats, 
though without supporting evidence; and (6) SOs believe food defense risk 
mitigation is not adequately funded by state or federal governments.   
These findings indicated that even though bias from FASCAT trainers and 
by individual trainers was potentially introduced to FASCAT assessments, SOs 
believe FASCAT has been useful to them in determining food system criticality.  
SOs indicated that more funding is needed from state and federal governments 
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to adequately mitigate and manage food defense risks, and that they require 
more comprehensive training from food defense subject matter experts in threat 
assessment, risk mitigation, and security management to reduce the possibility of 
bias from FASCAT training.  Policy makers can use the information learned in 
this chapter to determine how to better train state officials in food and agriculture 
criticality assessment and to eliminate bias in the data collection process used in 
FASCAT. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Sector 
Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) and the Collected Data 
To protect and secure food resources for the United States (U.S.) and 
prioritize funding for these protection efforts, it is crucial to have a method to 
compare food systems' criticality.  In 2007, the U.S. government funded 
development of the FASCAT to determine which food and agriculture systems 
were most critical to the nation as required by Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives 8 and 9.  FASCAT was developed in a collaborative process involving 
government officials and food industry subject matter experts (SMEs), collecting 
data and quantifying threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, second and third 
order consequences, and the impacts on the U.S. from failure of evaluated food 
and agriculture systems. In the past 4 years FASCAT has been used to evaluate 
the criticality of 731 disparate food commodity and product systems in the U.S.  
With the aid of FASCAT, multiple state governments successfully nominated food 
and agriculture systems as Department of Homeland Security Critical 
Infrastructure or Key Resources (CIKR).  The FASCAT method was examined to 
determine its difference from to the Department of Homeland Security risk 
assessment method, utility for determining food and agriculture system criticality, 
and validity of the questions it uses.  To determine FASCAT’s validity, linear 
regression models were used to determine (1) which groups of questions posed 
in FASCAT were better predictors of cumulative criticality scores; (2) whether the 
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items included in FASCAT's criticality method or the smaller subset of FASCAT 
items included in DHS's risk analysis method accounted for similar fraction of 
variation in scores assigned by FASCAT users.  Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) was used to determine which regression models best described criticality 
as determined by FASCAT users, and a mixed linear model was used to shrink 
estimates of criticality for individual food and agriculture systems.   
The results indicated that (1) some of the questions used in FASCAT 
strongly predicted food or agriculture system criticality and many questions used 
in FASCAT did not strongly predict criticality; (2) the FASCAT criticality formula 
was a stronger predictor of criticality compared to the DHS risk formula; (3) the 
cumulative criticality formula predicted criticality more strongly than weighted 
criticality formula; and (4) the mixed linear regression model did not change the 
order of food and agriculture system criticality to a large degree indicating that 
the cumulative scoring algorithm in FASCAT performs as it should.  The FASCAT 
criticality method is a sufficient method to determine food, and agriculture 
systems criticality and many of the questions used in FASCAT are strongly 
predictive of criticality scoring.  Despite the strong predictive nature of the 
questions used in FASCAT, the FASCAT algorithm can be refined to increase its 
predictive power and utility as a security resource prioritization tool.   
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Chapter 5: The Development of Novel Method for the Spatial Analysis of 
Criticality  
  In the context of National Security, multiple methods to quantify risk and 
criticality have been developed and deployed over the past 14 years to protect 
the nation’s most vital infrastructures and systems.  These methods included a 
wide variety of forms (e.g., qualitative and quantitative) and were targeted at 
various levels and types of critical infrastructures (e.g., individual facilities, sub-
systems, and systems).  One consistent problem is that these methods relied 
upon the subjective and likely biased inputs from subject matter experts (e.g., 
data estimates; generalized supply chain structure; perceived threats, 
probabilities and consequences).  To address these problems, there is a need for 
novel data collection that has the potential to eliminate the subjectivity and bias in 
data collection used in risk and criticality assessments.  Specifically, this novel 
method employs a user-generated, spatially explicit software platform for data 
collection and criticality assessment.  Specifically, this software collects supply 
chain structure data directly from privately owned companies, and then the 
software links these independent data together based upon spatial 
characteristics to objectively analyze criticality based upon the actual supply 
chain structure.  This method does not require any subjective estimation of 
supply chain structure or of disruptive events (e.g., hurricanes, floods, etc.) from 
subject matter experts, thus reducing bias introduced by subjective opinion. 
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Closing Statements & Recommendations 
 Even though significant advancement in risk and criticality assessment 
methods have occurred over the past thirteen years, many vulnerabilities still 
exist in food and agriculture systems.  In the United States, these problems are 
difficult due to the legal and regulatory environment in which food systems exist, 
and this environment makes constructive collaborative relationships between 
academia, the government, and the food industry extremely difficult.  Despite the 
difficult environment in which we operate, academics, government officials, and 
the food industry need to continue to work together to create effective food 
defense risk mitigation technologies. 
 In the future, research should be focused on collecting actual real time 
data directly from privately owned food companies.  These data will enable the 
almost instantaneous traceback of food contamination events and aid in the 
epidemiologic investigation of foodborne outbreaks.  If it turns out that collection 
of these data is not feasible, then methods that can derive system structure from 
open source data need to be developed.  Future analysis of the taste, flavor, and 
olfaction of chemical, biological, and toxins will help determine which agents are 
actually threats in a food system.  If the system structure is known, and the 
number of agents of concern can be identified, then sensor technology can be 
developed and placed at specific points in the food system to dramatically reduce 
food defense risks. 
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Appendix B: FASCAT Scoring & Mixed Model Results 
 
Table B1: Scores for all threat items in FASCAT. 
Variable type Name Score  
1.   Threat Foreign animal disease 5 
2.   Threat Destruction 2 
3.   Threat Lost access 1 
4.   Threat Drought 2 
5.   Threat Food pathogens vegetable 4 
6.   Threat Misinformation 2 
7.   Threat Chemical/toxin 3 
8.   Threat Loss of operation rights 2 
9.   Threat Pathogen Contamination 3 
10. Threat Plant disease 1 
11. Threat Radiological contamination 3 
12. Threat Cyber threat 2 
13. Threat Intentional adulteration 3 
14. Threat Theft 1 
15. Threat Production disruption 2 
16. Threat Plant pests 1 
17. Threat Exotic plant pest or disease 4 
18. Threat Economically motivated adulteration   2 
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Table B2: Scores for all consequence items in FASCAT. 
Variable type Name Score  
1.   Consequence Short-term system shut down 1 
2.   Consequence Loss of key output  1 
3.   Consequence Loss or contamination of herd or flock  2 
4.   Consequence Product shortage 2 
5.   Consequence Loss of tourism 2 
6.   Consequence Cost of response  2 
7.   Consequence Long-term system shutdown 4 
8.   Consequence Loss of access to customers 2 
9.   Consequence Mass casualty - human 5 
10. Consequence Reduced output 1 
11. Consequence Loss of capital 2 
12. Consequence Loss of seed source 2 
13. Consequence Loss of key input 1 
14. Consequence Loss of plant or breed stock 3 
15. Consequence Mass casualty - animal 2 
16. Consequence Brand damage 2 
17. Consequence Credit access 1 
18. Consequence Economic loss 3 
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Table B3: Scores for all 2nd & 3rd Order Effects items in FASCAT. 
Variable type Name Score  
1.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Damage to customers 2 
2.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Damage to tax base 2 
3.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Loss of public confidence  3 
4.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Disease spread to others 4 
5.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Government cost to respond 1 
6.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Loss of market access 2 
7.  2nd & 3rd Order Effects Loss of access to insurance 2 
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Table B4: Scores for all impact items in FASCAT. 
Variable type Name Score 
1.  Impact Short-term system shut down 1 
2.  Impact Loss of key output 1 
3.  Impact Loss or contamination of herd or flock 2 
4.  Impact Product shortage 2 
5.  Impact Loss of tourism 2 
6.  Impact Cost of response 2 
7.  Impact Long-term system shutdown 4 
8.  Impact Loss of access to customers 2 
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Table B5: Scores for all consequence items in FASCAT. 
Variable type Name Score 
1.  Consequence Less than 1 year to recover 1 
2.  Consequence Less than 5 states impacted 1 
3.  Consequence Greater than 1 year to recover 2 
4.  Consequence Loss of supply 2 
5.  Consequence Limited to 1 state 1 
6.  Consequence 10,000 human casualties 3 
7.  Consequence More than 5 states impacted 3 
8.  Consequence Loss of sub-system 2 
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Table B6: Scores for sub-system characteristics. 
Variable type Responses available Scores 
1.  Ease of Attack easy, medium, high 1, 2, 3 
2.  Probability of disaster low, medium, high 1, 2, 3 
3.  Size of component at risk small, medium, large,  
very large, > 5 states,  
national, international 
 1, 2, 3,  
4, 5,  
6, 8 
4.  Critical Components Yes, No 5, 0 
5.  Recovery < 3 months, < 6 months,  
< 12 months, > 12 months,  
not probable 
1, 2,  
3, 4,  
5 
6.  Concentration 10,000 human casualties 1, 2, 3, 4 
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Figure B1. Random effects model residuals, by food and agriculture system 
type, sorted from low to high, by the median of the system’s residuals. 
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Appendix C: Explanation of Mixed Model Approach 
 The FASCAT data contains several food and agriculture system types that 
have small sample sizes and extremely high or low criticality scores (e.g., spice 
processing, swine nursery operations).  This is potentially problematic because 
the observed average criticality of food and agriculture systems types may due to 
the arbitrary evaluation of a single (or few) but abnormally critical (or uncritical) 
food or agriculture systems (i.e., spice processing).   
 When examining the differences between food and agriculture system 
types (rank ordering by criticality scores), each food and agriculture system might 
be measured a number of times (e.g., farm inputs dairy).  Some food and 
agriculture system types (e.g., spice processing) will consistently score higher 
than others for reasons other than whether they are critical or not.  In testing the 
fixed effects (all variables that contribute to FASCAT criticality scores), controlling 
for a "random" effect of individual system differences controls for error due to 
small sample sizes within food and agriculture system types.  
 
 
 
